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Abstract
Round trip engineering of software from source code and reverse engineering of
software from binary files have both been extensively studied and the state-of-practice
have documented tools and techniques. Forward engineering of protocols has also
been extensively studied and there are firmly established techniques for generating
correct protocols. While observation of protocol behavior for performance testing has
been studied and techniques established, reverse engineering of protocol control flow
from observations of protocol behavior has not received the same level of attention.
State-of-practice in reverse engineering the control flow of computer network proto-
cols is comprised of mostly ad hoc approaches. We examine state-of-practice tools
and techniques used in three open source projects: Pidgin, Samba, and rdesktop. We
examine techniques proposed by computational learning researchers for grammatical
inference. We propose to extend the state-of-art by inferring protocol control flow
using grammatical inference inspired techniques to reverse engineer automata repre-
sentations from captured data flows. We present evidence that grammatical inference
is applicable to the problem domain under consideration.
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Dynamic Protocol Reverse Engineering
A Grammatical Inference Approach
I. Introduction
As the United States Air Force (USAF) extends into the Cyberspace domain,
the ease of breaking into computer networks and misusing distributed systems has
become increasingly problematic [163, 172, 173, 242, 280]. Deep understanding of the
protocols which traverse computer networks and enable distributed systems is increas-
ingly important to securing our computer networks and putting opponent’s networked
operations at risk.
1.1 Operations in Cyberspace
The DOD defines Cyberspace as a domain characterized by the use of electronics
and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked
systems and associated infrastructures. Operations in Cyberspace have both strategic
and tactical requirements. Tactics, Techniques and Procedures coupled with weapons
systems that produce reliable and predictable battle effects are essential. Freedom
of Cyberspace much like Freedom of the Seas and Freedom of the Skies has become
essential to our way of life. As such, our current inability to operate in Cyberspace
as a domain of military operations, governed by mathematical and electromagnetic
principles, requires us to develop, train and equip cyber forces that can guarantee
Freedom of Cyberspace. In the words of Secretary Wynne [280]:
Cyberspace is a domain for projecting and protecting national power, for
both strategic and tactical operations [212].
Vulnerabilities in technical standards and concrete implementations of technical
standards are cyber warriors fighting positions. Freedom of Cyberspace will require
tactical cyber power: the ability to degrade, disrupt, deny and destroy adversaries
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fighting positions while defending our own. Deep understanding of distributed system
is a critical enabler to developing cyber power in network centric cyber spaces.
In this thesis we focus on protocol reverse engineering as a method that enables
the generation of instruments of tactical cyber power in digital computer networks.
We do not discuss the broader topics of computer network exploitation/protection or
electronic warfare. In fact, we view protocol reverse engineering as only one facet of
the larger topic of tactical cyber power. Also, we will concentrate on technical means
that enable creation of tactical cyber weapons over doctrine, organization, and policy.
At the outset of performing the preliminary literature review it was apparent
that the volume of academic information concerning protocol forward engineering
greatly exceeded the volume of academic information on protocol reverse engineering.
It is our contention that the state-of-the-art in protocol reverse engineering methods
and tools remains largely shrouded from the view of the general public.
Due, in part, to the underground nature of the subject, effective application of
protocol reverse engineering to generate effective instruments of tactical cyber power
is a challenging problem.
Generation of tactical cyber weapons requires a deep undertanding of the tech-
nical architecture of the systems under consideration. A cyber weapon must provide
effective, reliable, and repeatable, battlespace effects.
A first step is to recover models of protocols that increase analyst understanding
and support formal analysis to verify the effects of network centric cyber weapons.
1.2 Problem Domain
Correct protocol design is a difficult engineering task. Gerard Holzmann offers
the following:
It is the unexpected sequences of events that lead to protocol failures, and
the hardest problem in protocol design is precisely that we must try to
expect the unexpected [109].
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Protocol model recovery from network traffic is a challenging problem.
! While the algorithm domain under consideration is proveably NPC we
do not provide proof that the problem domain is NPC. We only conjecture
the problem domain is NPC.
Given the complexity of correctly designing a protocol specification and then
accurately engineering a protocol implementation it is not surprising that protocols
exhibit vulnerabilities. Causes of unexpected conditions that expose vulnerabilities
range from accidental oversight [220] to deliberate attack [12, Section 7.2].
The problem domain under consideration is design recovery of protocol models
from captured data flows. Ultimately, the recovered designs should support formal
analysis that identifies implementation issues that allow deliberate attack or acciden-
tal failure. In essence, can we discover protocol implementation issues that allow
deliberately crafted packets which lead a protocol parser to unexpected conditions?
1.3 Related Problem Domains
Network traffic classification and deep packet inspection are related to proto-
col reverse engineering. Both domains require understanding of protocols that might
not be documented in open specifications [76, 126, 127, 185, 193, 200, 264]. Likewise,
signature based intrusion detection requires deep knowledge of protocols’ inner work-
ings [178]. We conjecture that behavioral based intrusion detection could also benefit
from models recovered via protocol reverse engineering. Finally, protocol reverse engi-
neering can draw practical methods from the domain of protocol conformance testing.
While we concentrated on a subset of application level protocols on IPv4 net-
works similar experimental analysis could be conducted against other classes of pro-
tocols, such as SCADA 1 or SS7 2, for vulnerability assessment and potentially gen-
eration of targeted effects.
1Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition - [47, 79, 134] introduce the subject. [47, Section 6.7,
Chap 12] covers TCP/IP encapsulated SCADA communications.
2Signaling System 7 - a set of telephony signaling protocols
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1.4 Related Application Domains
Automated specification generation, automated test generation and automated
conformance testing provide architectures that are useful for protocol reverse engi-
neering. Dssouli et al presents a test automation architecture for distributed systems
in [68]. Ammons examines automated specification generation from program execu-
tion traces [6]. Automated test generation for white-box and black-box testing is well
studied for software testing. Random boundary testing methods for network protocols
are covered by [249, Chapter 14] and for software testing in [175,188].
Tretmans covers OSI protocol conformance testing in [257] while Berg examines
the similarities between regular inference and conformance testing in “On the Corre-
spondence Between Conformance Testing and Regular Inference” [22]. Conformance
testing as an Angluin query styled learning problem is also examined by Lai in [136]
which presents a genetic algorithm approach to adaptive model checking.
1.5 Investigative Questions
The focus of this research is the evaluation of existing Grammatical Inference
(GI) algorithms for the dynamic protocol reverse engineering domain. GI is a branch
of artificial intelligence that concentrates on the inference of grammatical structures
from samples of a language. In particular, we ask the following questions:
IQ1 What information is necessary to reverse engineer the control portion of appli-
cation layer protocols from data flows?
IQ2 Given the proven [7,95] difficulty of inferring finite automata from positive sam-
ples only, are there GI approaches that are appropriate for reverse engineering
automata representations of the control portion of application layer protocols
from data flows?
We propose to apply GI algorithms to recover structure from the protocol stream
that is not immediately obvious from observation of individual packets. We hope to
advance the state-of-art in protocol reverse engineering by automatically revealing
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structural relationships much like an oscilloscope displays waveforms from an electric
signal. We will concentrate on a posteriori analysis instead of online analysis of live
execution traces.
While we discuss computer science oriented theoretical aspects of GI we are
more interested in the engineering oriented pragmatic recovery of structure and the
presentation of experimental evidence that establishes the applicability of GI to the
problem of protocol model recovery.
Finally, we recognize that the approach presented is only a partial solution to
the problem domain under consideration. Human analysts must continue to apply
common heuristics (e.g. identifying signpost values, block structure inference, or
windowed entropy).
1.6 Document Overview
In Chapter II we present the problem domain under consideration. Next, in
Chapter III we introduce the Chomsky Hierarchy as a framework for discussing
computational learnability and overview several existing grammatical inference al-
gorithms. In Chapter IV we describe the experimental architecture used to evaluate
two selected gramatical inference algorithms against POP3 and SMTP traffic from
the IDEVAL data set. Finally, in Chapter V we provide the results of our evaluation
and propose areas that can be refined in future work.
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II. Problem Domain
This chapter provides background regarding the problem domain. First, we describe
the problem domain under consideration with with an English description. We dis-
cuss distributed systems and issues related to protocol design recovery. Finally, we
introduce protocol reverse engineering and overview state-of-practice and state-of-art
reverse engineering tools and techniques.
2.1 Distributed Systems
A distributed system in the most abstract sense is comprised of three elements:
nodes the processes executing on servers, desktops, or sensors; links cable plant,
air, or other physical transmission medium; and protocols. A protocol is a kind of
agreement about the exchange of messages in a distributed system [49, 109, 250]. A
complete protocol definition is very similar to a language description: it defines a
strict syntactical format for valid messages; it defines data exchange procedure rules;
and it defines semantics, a vocabulary of valid messages and their meaning [109]. The
protocols grammar must be logically consistent and complete. The procedure rules
should explicitly specify what is permitted or forbidden [109]. Finally, the sender and
receiver must implement compatible rules for communication to succeed [109].
A distributed system can be abstracted by dividing it into application stacks,
the components that make up the nodes; and protocol stacks, the layered architecture
that implements the rules of communication. The application stacks are the oper-
ating systems and application software on any given node. To avoid combinatorial
state explosion, protocols for distributed systems are often designed, developed, and
implemented in layered architectures [49,150,252]. Each layer of the communications
architecture implements services that are presented to the more abstract layers above
it.
Figure 2.1 shows the Open Systems Interconnect (OSI) reference model proposed
by International Organization for Standards (ISO) in 1982 [236].
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Figure 2.1: OSI Reference Model [236].
The protocol stack is the composite of the layers that are utilized by a distributed
system. A protocol stack implements a protocol reference model. The Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP) / Internet Protocol (IP) protocol family concentrates on the
transport and network layers of the OSI reference model [49,243]. The protocol stack
that supports a distributed system is completed by adding a data link and physical
link implementation, such as Ethernet over fiber optic cable. Vulnerabilities in a
protocol stack can be leveraged as a propagation vector for attacks on an application
stack [12, Section 7.2]. Methods to exploit known vulnerabilities are readily available
in pre-packaged frameworks such as Cain & Abel1 [176] and Metasploit2 [83].
To limit the scope of our research, we have selected to focus on application layer
protocols and concentrate on the protocol stack over the application stack. Specifi-
cally, we will concentrate on application layer protocols that use the TCP/IP protocol
family version 4 (IPv4) which defines much of the modern Internet [49,243]. We con-
sider TCP/IP exchanges of TCP packets that encapsulate application layer protocols.
1Cain & Abel - http://www.oxid.it/cain.html
2Metasploit - http://www.metasploit.com
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Figure 2.2: Internet from TCP Perspective [78].
Constraining the OSI reference model to just TCP connections leads to Figure 2.2.
TCP, the dominant transport protocol on the Internet [119], uses the communications
system at the layers below it as a simple black box and does not concern itself with
the layers in the model above it.
Likewise distributed systems which implement application level protocols use
TCP and the lower levels as a black box.
A Finite State Machine (FSM) is used to model any device that reacts to its
environment and changes its state according to the inputs. The FSM model is often
extended, to include outputs, as a Mealy-Machine. A well formed TCP packet has a
source TCP/IP implementation (Host A) that uses an automaton to keep track of the
state of a particular connection to a destination TCP automata (Host B) [33,49,78].
A client application communicates with a server application through a TCP
client that connects to a TCP server through the network [33]. While a TCP con-
nection is identified by Source Address/Port and Destination Address/Port pair; the
temporal relationship is actually determined by the state of the TCP Server/TCP
Client pair at the source and TCP Server/TCP Client pair at the destination. The
distributed systems client application and server application also maintain separate
state automata which transition states depending on the operators received. As shown
in Figure 2.3, when a distributed system uses connection oriented TCP as a transport
we are really dealing with at least four automata in each direction.
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Figure 2.3: TCP Client/Server Topology [33].
Figure 2.4: IP Packet Structure - 32-bit wide IPv4 IP packet
structure [93].
Because we are considering application level protocols transported over IPv4
connections, this naturally gives rise to data structures embodied in protocol au-
tomata, formats of protocol operations, and data relationships from state transitions.
2.1.1 Data Structures. The three primary data structures in our selected
problem domain are the IP packet structure, shown in Figure 2.4, the User Datagram
Protocol (UDP) packet structure, shown in Figure 2.5, and TCP packet structure
shown in Figure 2.6. Figure 2.4, Figure 2.5, and Figure 2.6 are laid out so they are
32-bits wide.
The UDP and TCP packets are encapsulated into IP packets at the network
transport layer so their source and destination IP numbers are derived from the 32-
bit IP Source Address and 32-bit IP Destination Address. The 16-bit wide source and
destination ports are included in the packet structure (UDP or TCP) that makes up
the IP payload [49].
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Figure 2.5: UDP Packet Structure - 32-bit wide IPv4 UDP
packet structure [93].
The UDP packet structure is rather simple because the protocol does not pro-
vide connection oriented features. Distributed systems that use UDP for transport
can be considered connectionless in the transport layer and must provide their own
mechanism for re-transmission of failed communication [49]. Example uses for UDP
are Domain Name Service (DNS) and games such as World of Warcraft.
The TCP packet structure requires more information to support reliable commu-
nications service. The TCP protocol provides for reliability, flow control, multiplexing,
precedence, security, and connection oriented transfers [49, 243]
2.1.2 Data Relationships. Data relationships between packets occur at dif-
ferent levels of granularity: packet, connection or session. Another relationship is the
temporal ordering of packet arrivals which can be disturbed by packet fragmentation.
And a third is the possible causality of connection and session arrivals. Understand-
ing these relationships is vital to choosing the parameters for clustering packets from
traces into unique conversations between application level protocol endpoints.
2.1.2.1 Granularity. At the transport level TCP maintains a com-
munication channel by using counters and synchronization flags. Application level
protocols might also exhibit causal session structures. Communications at the ap-
plication level also often have a logical session structure that associate packets and
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Figure 2.6: TCP Packet Structure - 32-bit wide IPv4 TCP
packet structure [93].
connections. The level of granularity (packet, connection, or session) must be consid-
ered:
Packet Granularity - IP, UDP, and Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
[208] are all connectionless IPv4 protocols. That is, communications can be sent
without prior arrangement. IP, ICMP, Address Resolution Protocol (ARP),
Routing Information Protocol (RIP), and Open Shortest Path First (OSPF)
routing protocol can be placed at the network layer (Figure 2.1). UDP, on the
other hand, is a connectionless transport mechanism at the network transport
layer (Figure 2.1).
Connection Granularity - At the transport level (Figure 2.1) the most fundamen-
tal relationship between the packet structures is a socket identified by the IP
Source Address/Port pair and the associated IP Destination Address/Port pair.
At an arbitrary point in time a TCP connection between a server and client
can be identified by the IP Source Address/Port pair and the associated IP
Destination Address/Port pair. Much TCP behavior is driven by timers and
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timeouts. TCP inherently embodies greater temporal causality that is encoded
in sequence and acknowledgment numbers in a specific TCP connection. This
level of granularity, especially for TCP connections, has been widely studied
(e.g. [42, 100,119]).
Session Granularity - The IPv4 suite provides for sessions using Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP) [221] which is a transport independent application layer control
protocol. SIP supports session setup, maintenance, and teardown with one or
more participants. SIP is used in voice, video, and instant messaging appli-
cations. Another alternative is International Telecommunications Union Stan-
dardization Sector (ITU-T) X.225 connection-oriented session protocol3 While
session specifications are available application level protocols often use custom
session level management.
2.1.2.2 Packet and Connection Fragmentation. Fragmentation is a
feature of IP to support transport of packets across networks with different Maxi-
mum Transfer Units (MTU). Shannon [240] presents a detailed study of packet level
fragmentation. The majority of fragmented traffic in the study was UDP. While
ICMP, IP security (IPsec) [129], and Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunneled traffic
were also commonly fragmented. Fragmentation occurred in 0.5 percent of the to-
tal traffic observed [240]. Reconstruction of connections from packet traces has the
following issues [260]:
1. The IP datagrams may be fragmented.
2. IP fragments may arrive out of order.
3. Packets may be missing in the network trace because they were dropped during
capture.
4. Adversaries might intentionally create non-deterministic situations with tools
like fragrouter [1].
3ITU-T Recommendations are available at http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC/en.
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Connection oriented TCP also suffers from fragmentation effects when TCP
segments are interleaved because the encapsulating IP fragments arrive out of order
[20].
There is no direct algorithmic means for reconstructing a connections content
from a trace of network packets. Correcting IP packet fragmentation and reassembling
TCP connection stream requires a significant portion of the IPv4 protocol stack [260].
Turner [260] proposed the following possibilities: pre-process data with libnids which
partially implements a Linux 2.0 TCP/IP protocol stack in user-space [275]; use packet
reassembly code from Wireshark [281]; port a TCP/IP stack from open sources; or
write a custom protocol stack from scratch.
2.1.2.3 Data Representation. Application layer protocols can be clas-
sified into binary and human readable ASCII text protocols. Text protocols restrict
their operators and payload to printable ASCII text characters. Binary protocol op-
erators are comprised of data fields that can be mapped to standard data types such
as integers or strings. For example, SMTP uses an ASCII text representation for the
operators while protocols like RPC and SMB/CIFS use binary representations. This
means that Σ, the set of protocol operators, can be structured text or structured
binary data.
2.1.3 Other Data Characteristics. User behavior also exhibits higher order
structure. The problem is examined by Kannan [125] who defines a session as a group
of network connections related to a network task. A network task is activity that
emanates from an external event (the causal origin) [125]. We do not examine higher
order session structures such as aggregate user session structures for web traffic.
Finally, protocols which use encryption (e.g. SSL, SSH, RDP) or are tunneled
through encryption mechanisms offer additional challenges. Wright [277] presents an
exploratory look at identification of packets in encrypted tunnels. Gebski [91] also
conducts an experimental evaluation of a model to detect and identify TCP protocols
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Figure 2.7: Trace Collection Architecture - proposed by Saleh
[231].
in encrypted tunnels. We will not examine design recovery from encrypted or tunneled
traces.
2.2 Network Trace Collection
Placement of the probe points for trace data collection must be considered,
we should rationalize the observation points used. International Standard 9646 (IS-
9646) defines four test architectures for OSI protocol conformance testing [68]. The
four types are local, distributed, coordinated and remotes test architectures [257].
We can use the ISO test architecture descriptions to classify where a protocol reverse
engineering effort collects trace data. The level of analysis can alternatively be clas-
sified according to the fidelity of observation described by Bhargavan in [24] which is
partially determined by the placement of a monitor for a device under test.
Saleh also discusses placement of data collection points, shown in Figure 2.7
as the Upper Service Access Point (USAP) and Lower Service Access Point (LSAP)
[230]. Like Saleh [230] we will refer to trace collections above the protocol under
observation as Upper Service Access Points and trace collections below the protocol
under observation as Lower Service Access Points. Saleh considers data collected at
the LSAP to provide protocol primitives and data collected at an USAP to provide
service primitives to layers above.
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Figure 2.8: Bro deployment with network tap - the network
tap duplicates the physical layer signaling for in-line full-duplex
traffic analysis by the Bro Intrusion Detection System [141].
In a TCP/IP network port mirroring and hubbing out are two techniques for
trace collection that do not require instrumenting the protocol under investigation.
Port mirroring, or port spanning, is supported by some Layer-3 switching devices.
The switching device copies all traffic on a user specified port to another physical
port on the switch [233]. Hubbing out is a technique in which a target device and
analyzer are located on the same Ethernet network segment by plugging them in to
the same hub [233].
Packets dropped from the sample data by the capture mechanism will be an
issue for high bandwidth traffic. Solutions include using custom high-speed collection
hardware, such as [200], implementing hardware to duplicate network traffic at the
physical layer, or limiting the study to low-speed protocols that can be captured with
a high degree of confidence. Bhargavan used a modified Linux system to sniff TCP
network traffic by hubbing out on a 100 Mbps connection, describing this configuration
as a co-networked monitor [24]. The implementers of the Bro intrusion detection
system recommend the use of a physical layer network tap, shown in Figure 2.8, that
exactly duplicates the physical layer signaling for in-line full-duplex traffic analysis
[141].
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2.3 Application Level Protocol Data Flow Recovery
We differentate data flows from the usage of network flows that is commonly
used in graph theory [65]. This is because we are not interested in modeling the net-
work as a graph but instead modeling the actual flow of data, thus data flow, which
is captured in a trace file. Others have characterized packet data flows as: packet
trains [118]; streams and torrents [35]; or flights [239]. As discussed in Section 2.1.2.2,
we can define a data flow as a quintuple 〈 source IP, source port, destination IP, desti-
nation port, protocol〉 [264]. An advantage of using tuples is that they support formal
definitions of the operators that apply. Also, defining the mathematical symbology
allows us to discuss the problem domain domain in a more compact form.
2.3.1 Na¨ıve Flow Membership. In the case of TCP/IP, at the packet level
of granularity, we can use the TCP setup (three-way handshake) to recognize the
beginning of a partial flow and TCP teardown to recognize the end of a partial flow.
Several studies have used TCP flows defined by the SYN/FIN control mechanism in
TCP to denote flows [42]. This representation is adequate if we consider network
traffic as bi-directional flows comprised of arbitrary groupings of packets defined by
the attributes of their endpoints. Our na¨ıve definition of flow membership does not
address the temporal nature of application protocol communications at the session
level. Also, it does not account for timeout or connection loss.
2.3.2 Accurate Flow Membership. In reality, we will not get enough infor-
mation from the five-tuple 〈source IP, source port, destination IP, destination port,
protocol〉 to accurately determine a packets flow membership. The traditional use of
well known port numbers4 to identify application level protocols is in question. In
contemporary network traces port numbers no longer provide reliable recognition of
application protocol traffic types. Current Internet traffic often ignores established
port number conventions [154]. Statistical techniques have been proposed to accu-
4The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority Port Numbers provides a list of well known ports
[116].
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Figure 2.9: Wireshark Following SMTP Conversation - Wire-
shark can reconstruct the conversation between the server and
client using internal knowledge of the SMTP protocol.
rately identify the type of application protocol encapsulated in connections. Ma [154]
presents a Markov process model technique and a longest common subsequence ap-
proach. Both techniques provide statistical recognition of the application level con-
tents encapsulated in transport level connections.
Figure 2.9 shows an application level SMTP data flow reconstructed by follow-
ing the underlying transport level TCP connection using Wireshark. Wireshark can
reconstruct the conversation between the server and client because it uses internal
knowledge of the structure of the SMTP protocol.
2.3.3 Stateful vs. Stateless. Application data flow membership will also be
impacted by the state characteristics of the protocol under consideration. A stateful
server maintains persistent information about its clients while a stateless server does
not. SMTP and POP3 are stateful while HTTP is stateless. State information is
added to web applications that use HTTP by the use of cookies that encode the
session id and/or session state. If the server is stateless but maintains soft-state, data
that is maintained for the client on the server for a limited time [253, p.91], then we
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must have a method that detects early session termination or incomplete sessions. As
is the case when a user navigates away from an HTTP based web application without
actively terminating the session. This is difficult without a construct that handles
timeout events.
Paxson and Floyd’s study of wide-area TCP arrival processes found that session
arrivals were well modeled by Poisson processes with hourly rates even though individ-
ual connection arrivals were not [195]. Nuzman [186] found that the arrival of HTTP
connections aggregated into sessions also reflect a Poisson process. Kannan [125] used
this observation as a key part to discovering and characterizing causality in network
traffic. Meent [264] uses a 20 second interval for membership in a flow at the packet
level. This means TCP/IP packets identified by the quintuple must be within 20
seconds of each other to be classified as members of the same flow. McGregor also
provides some clustering techniques for classifying flows in [165].
2.3.4 Single-connection vs. Multi-connection. Data flow membership will
also be impacted by how the protocol uses the underlying transport. SMTP and
POP3 session boundaries are easily detected because each session is encapsulated in a
single TCP connection [112,113]. This means the connection and session granularity
are equivalent for SMTP and POP3. On the other hand, version 1.1 of the HTTP
specification allows for re-use of open TCP connections for multiple requests [80].
HTTP based web applications use session identifiers to associate sessionless HTTP
requests into a logical application session.
To determine the start and end of a complete flow or session of an application
level protocol we must understand the operators that support session setup and tear-
down. Another possibility is to detect session identifiers encoded in the packet traces
of the application layer protocol under consideration.
2.3.5 Single-channel vs. Multi-channel. Another concern is the number of
connection level channels that make up the communication. Session detection for
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Figure 2.10: Flow level breakdown of a simple FTP transfer
- the control channel is on port 1291 and the out-of-band data
channel on port 1292 [15].
single-connection, single-channel protocols, like SMTP or POP3, can be determined
from TCP socket connection status. For more complex multi-channel protocols we
must understand the internal structure of the protocols (e.g. FTP and RPC) to
properly group the packets and connections that make up the application level data
flows [15, 260]. A notional multi-channel FTP flow is shown in Figure 2.10 which
shows the control channel and an out-of-band data channel.
2.4 Application Level Network Traces into Automata
We must address the following four issues:
• Network trace collection.
• Application level protocol data flow recovery.
• Protocol format (Σ) recovery.
• Protocol transition function (δ) recovery.
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We discussed the issues of trace collection in Section 2.2 and data flow recovery
in Section 2.3. Here we concentrate on format (Σ) recovery and transition function
(δ) recovery from existing traces.
Protocol format recognition is coupled with the data portion of a protocol. As
discussed by Lee in [142] the data portion specifies functions that involve parameter
values associated with messages.
Protocol transition function recognition focuses on the control portion of a pro-
tocol over the data portion [142]. Given two endpoints of a distributed communica-
tions system, a sender S = 〈Qs,Σ, δs, qs0, Fs〉 and receiver R = 〈Qr,Σ, δr, qr0, Fr〉, how
can we go about recovering a model of δs and δr? What is the minimum knowledge
we need a priori to recover the design using only a captured data flow of the finite
members of Σ?
While, we can recover the expected Q,Σ,δ,q0, and F from protocol specifica-
tions, by analysis of source code, or even reverse engineering binary code, what if
specifications or source code are not available?
2.5 Protocol Design Recovery
We must determine operator formats (data portion) and determine automata
(control portion). This means we must know or infer the states, operators, transitions,
initial state(s), and final state(s) which define the behavior of the protocol under
consideration. To frame the discussion we present an overview of forward engineering
and re-engineering practices. Figure 2.11 shows the inter-relationship of re-engineering
practices.
2.5.1 Forward Engineering. Forward engineering is the traditional engineer-
ing process of moving from high-level abstractions to the physical implementation of a
system [40,214]. Protocol engineering is an interdisciplinary approach which empha-
sizes the use of sound engineering principles and formal methods to develop reliable
communication software [230]. Protocol forward engineering efforts can utilize formal
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Figure 2.11: Relationship of Re-engineering Practices - Re-
verse engineering attempts to recover higher levels of abstrac-
tion, restructuring modifies system artifacts at the same level of
abstraction and re-engineering uses reverse engineered artifacts
to generate a new physical implementation [214].
techniques for analysis and modeling but many protocols are designed and imple-
mented using informal approaches [109,231]. Even widely used protocols like HTTP,
SMTP, and POP3 rely on English language descriptions of correct control flow.
2.5.2 Reverse Engineering. Reverse engineering is the practice of discovering
the technological principles of a device/object or system through analysis of its struc-
ture, function, and operation [40,108,214]. Software reverse engineering concentrates
on analysis of software through disassembly and debugging of a software program.
In some sense the inverse of forward engineering software reverse engineering is also
referred to as reverse code engineering (RCE).
2.5.3 Protocol Reverse Engineering. Protocol reverse engineering is the ap-
plication of reverse engineering, often including RCE, to recover the automata and
operators which define the protocol. Protocol reverse engineering can be tightly cou-
pled with RCE. If the protocol specification is not available, RCE of source code can
provide many clues to the structure of the protocol. RCE can also be applied to the
binary programs that implement a protocol to approximate the original design/engi-
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neering decisions. Protocol reverse engineering without access to specifications or
source code can be significantly more challenging.
2.5.3.1 Static vs. Dynamic. Static vs. Dynamic protocol reverse en-
gineering (see Saleh [230]) are differentiated by information source. Static protocol
reverse engineering is the recovery of protocol information from specification docu-
ments and implementation artifacts including system documentation, source code, or
even reverse engineered binary code. The process is static from the perspective of the
protocol under inspection. RCE of binary code will likely involve dynamic runtime
analysis at the local level. Lie proposed creating models from protocol code using
an extensible compiler system and applied the system to analyze cache coherence
protocols in multi-processor systems [149].
Dynamic protocol reverse engineering is the recovery of protocol information
from observations of the system in action. If the protocol is part of a layered architec-
ture (such as the TCP/IP protocol suite which implements in part the OSI reference
model) the traces may be collected at an observation point established at a layer
below the protocol or a layer above the protocol. An observation point above the
protocols layer should collect events that are caused by service requests from layers
above the protocol under observation.
Much like putting a multi-meter or oscilloscope at the inputs (lower service
access point) and outputs (upper service access point) of an electronic circuit to
determine its internal operation by collecting traces of inputs and outputs we will
collect packets from the lower service access point (LSAP) and upper service access
point (USAP) of the protocol automaton under consideration. Then we can attempt
to infer the internal operation of the protocol automaton or construct an equivalent
automaton.
2.5.3.2 Who needs it? Distributed systems rely on the correctness
of both open and proprietary protocols to provide functionality. As an example,
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Microsoft’s proprietary Server Message Block/Common Internet File System (SMB/-
CIFS) is often encapsulated in TCP connections [105]. Deep understanding of the
protocols which underpin distributed systems is increasingly important to computer
security efforts [100, 135, 250]. Protocol reverse engineering is often the only option
available to develop an understanding of proprietary protocols that allows us to vali-
date that the protocol implementation is correct, reliable and secure.
Protocol reverse engineering has been proposed for a range of purposes including:
conformance testing [143]; design recovery [231]; to develop interoperable interfaces
between incompatible protocols [194, 248]; as a means to enhance network security
analysis [100]; and to develop signatures for network intrusion detection systems [178].
Despite these practical uses the practice is hindered by legal obstacles designed to
thwart theft of trade secrets and, a perhaps deserved, perceived lack of legitimacy
[111,199].
2.6 State-of-practice
State-of-practice reverse engineering tools and techniques for file formats and
binary executables are presented through several hacker oriented books and websites
(e.g. [72, 75, 87, 98, 132]). Collection and observation of TCP/IP network traffic is
also well covered (e.g. [48, 84, 98, 190, 242, 251, 279]). There are a few studies (e.g.
[82, 100, 143, 229]) and web articles [210] that discuss protocol reverse engineering.
The topic, possibly due to its somewhat underground nature, has not received broad
academic treatment.
Fortunately, the state-of-practice is documented by open source projects that
apply protocol reverse engineering to re-implement proprietary protocols. Three se-
lected open source projects that use protocol reverse engineering methods are Pidgin,
Samba, and Rdesktop [38, 50, 258]. Because the protocol specifications are not com-
pletely available all three projects rely on reverse engineering.
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2.6.1 Tools. The basic toolset capabilities required for TCP/IP protocol
reverse engineering is the ability to capture/record, manipulate, and analyze TCP/IP
packets. There is a wide range of open source, public domain, and commercial tools
that provide capabilites that are useful for protocol reverse engineering efforts 5. Son-
nenburg et al [245] argue that open source machine learning is key to supporting
experimental reproducibility. Joyner and Stein also argue the value of open source
software to mathematical studies in an opinion piece [122]. In the interests of repro-
ducibility we examined tools that are openly available either as open source or public
domain. Below we discuss several open source tools that can assist with TCP/IP pro-
tocol reverse engineering within the context of our four reverse engineering problems:
trace collection, data flow recovery, format recovery, and transition function recovery
2.6.1.1 Trace Collection. One commonly referred-to tool is Wireshark
shown in Figure 2.12 [48]. Wireshark, formerly called Ethereal, is an open source
packet capture program. It includes dissector algorithms which recognize and parse
many text and binary application level protocols [190, p.79]. Another often-mentioned
tool for packet capture is tcpdump [51]. Packet data flows are stored in several file
formats. Because Wireshark and tcpdump both use pcap, libpcap under UNIX and
WinPcap library under Windows, their file formats are compatible. WinPcap on
Windows and libpcap on UNIX provide similar application programming interfaces
(API) and are commonly referred to as the pcap API. The tcpdump website that
hosts libpcap provides links to several related utilities and projects built with the
pcap API.
In the assessment of Kreibich, author of NetDude, the trifecta of Pcap, tcpdump,
and Wireshark form the de facto standard tool set for TCP/IP protocol reverse en-
gineering [133].
5List of tools (e.g. [56] and [51, Related tools]) are readily available via the Internet.
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2.6.1.2 Data Flow Recovery. There are tools that can reconstruct
connection level traces from packet traces. For example, NetDude [133] includes a
demux (de-multiplexer) plugin that breaks packet traces into sub-traces along the
TCP connection boundaries. The sub-traces are stored in pcap compatible trace files.
Regrettably, the sub-traces do not contain the complete communication between the
server and client. Bhargavan proposes the development of Network Event Recognition
Language (NERL) [26, 27] to reconstruct application level protocols for monitoring
purposes. A NERL implementation is described in [25], including analysis of SMTP,
but a reference implementation is not made publicly available.
There are some tools to reconstruct session level traces from packet traces.
Chaosreader [34] and tcpflow [73] both recreate session flows from packet traces. Un-
fortunately, the output from both tools is formatted for human review not automated
processing.
2.6.1.3 Format and Transition Recovery. We discovered no publicly
available tools that provide automated format or transition function recovery from
network traces. This is further discussed in Section 2.8
2.6.1.4 Miscellaneous Tools. The pcap API is used by a wide range of
utilities and tools to generate statistics from packet traces. Automated support for
packet level analysis is available from Tstat [223] and tcptrace [191]. Several tools add
features to support online and live packet manipulation and replay of captured data.
Flowreplay [260], based on Turner’s earlier work on tcpreplay for datalink replay,
was designed to replay TCP/IP traffic at the transport and application layer. Scapy
is an interactive packet manipulation program [29]. Paxson created tcpanaly [195]
to automatically analyze TCP implementations at the packet level of granularity.
The tool is not publicly available. Other tools are focused on filtering traffic from
real time collections for direct observation by a human operator. Examples include:
Trafshow [272], Ngrep [217] and Ntop [64].
25
Figure 2.12: Wireshark - Ready for “test, capture, and stare”.
2.6.1.5 Programming Toolkits. Finally, there are several toolkits, be-
sides Pcap, which provide APIs to ease the development of network tools. The libnet
library [234] is a toolkit allowing the construction and injection of packets. Another
toolkit is libdnet which supports low level network operations for several languages (C,
C++, Python, Perl and Ruby) on many UNIX variants and Microsoft Windows [244].
The libevent toolkit provides an event oriented API. The event abstraction allows de-
velopers a design alternative to polling loops and threads when processing network
traces [160]. Libevent supports per event timers with callbacks on timeout. Another
library is libnids which provides a Linux version 2.0 TCP/IP protocol stack in user
space [275]. The libnids toolkit uses libpcap and libnet internally to provide IP frag-
ment reassembly and IP stream reconstruction [275]. The libnet, libdnet, libevent,
and libnids toolkits are accessible from scripting languages allowing rapid adhoc pro-
totyping.
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2.6.2 Techniques. Although protocol reverse engineering involves tools, the
key is the reversers ability to understand the assumptions and design decisions of
the people who created the protocol specification or implemented the protocol, and
then undermine them. Reverse engineering requires in-depth knowledge of myriad
technical specifications and specific implementations coupled with an understanding
of the engineering decisions of the original designers.
! It should be noted that the projects used both online and oﬄine tech-
niques.
One protocol reverse engineering technique used by all three projects contrib-
utors is described, somewhat lightheartedly, as test, capture, and stare [258]. The
technique is an adhoc approach that depends on fast turnaround of simple tests that
involve capturing network traffic resulting from varying parameters in operators. Test,
capture, and stare informally defines the state-of-practice for protocol model reverse
engineering from captured data flows.
Two other prominent techniques are protocol filters and protocol specific scan-
ners. A protocol filter is a Man in the Middle (MITM) proxy server that can make
changes to protocol data before it is passed on to a target server. MITM proxy
servers, as shown in Figure 2.13, use session hijacking techniques such as ARP poi-
soning [98, p.215] or DNS poisoning [98, p.216] to re-direct traffic from the original
communication between a client and server on network path A. When the MITM
proxy server is active the client communicates with the MITM proxy on path B
and the server communicates with the MITM proxy on network path C. Filters in
the MITM proxy allow specific or global substitutions of packet contents. A MITM
proxy server based protocol filter can be essential in online (or live) reverse engineer-
ing [82, p.9].
A protocol scanner uses known signpost values, such as error codes, to guide
exploration of protocol structure. Scanners can be used to find new parts of a protocol
or to determine some properties of a protocol operation [258]. One challenge of
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Figure 2.13: MITM Attack Topology [82, Figure 2.1].
developing protocol scanners is recognizing the exact meaning of known signpost
values and how the proprietary parser responds to those values [258].
2.7 Case Studies
Here we present an overview of protocol reverse engineering as used in three
selected open source projects that rely on protocol reverse engineering methods: Pid-
gin [50], Samba [258], and Rdesktop [38]. While there are other projects that apply
protocol reverse engineering we find that the selected projects are significant because
they are concentrated community driven efforts that openly present the tools and
techniques used. In fact, the results of each project are available as open source.
2.7.1 Pidgin. Pidgin is a multi-protocol Instant Messaging (IM) client that
supports the use of proprietary IM servers [50]. Pidgins plug-in architecture allows
independent efforts towards reverse engineering and re-implementing proprietary IM
protocols. It is difficult to characterize the overall protocol reverse engineering ap-
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proach used by Pidgin contributors. In part, because IM protocol specific plug-ins
are developed independently. Although protocol filters are available for IM protocols
it is not clear if they were used by plug-in authors [2]. In an E-mail conversation
the implementer of one protocol mentioned that Wireshark was critical. While the
client fully implements open IM standards such as Extensible Messaging and Pres-
ence Protocol (XMMP) there are still communications issues between the proprietary
IM clients and proprietary servers. One example is that file transfers using the Win-
dows Live Messenger compatible 6 .NET protocol have not yet implemented faster
peer-to-peer functionality [241]. Pidgin plug-ins for proprietary IM protocols, such as
Windows Live and Yahoo, must be patched when the protocol is changed. The delay
between protocol changes and working client software caused by reverse engineering
can be months.
2.7.2 Samba. Samba is an open source implementation of the closed source
proprietary Microsoft Windows SMB/CIFS implementation. The Samba project, un-
like Pidgin, must support several different session and application level protocols to
implement SMB/CIFS functionality. The project has taken over 12 years to man-
ually reverse engineer SMB/CIFS [58, 258]. The effort has successfully achieved in-
teroperability with Microsoft Windows file and print sharing services. It has also
implemented Windows NT domain controller services and the project plans to imple-
ment active directory cababilities [105,258]. Samba is the basis of Microsoft Windows
network interoperability for many UNIX based systems including Apples Mac OS X
since version 10.1 (Shown in Figure 2.14) [63]. Recently, the project established the
Protocol Freedom Information Foundation (PFIF) to acquire protocol documentation
Microsoft made available due to European Union court decisions [259].
Samba is unique in that the effort has been guided by consistent leadership.
Andrew Tridgell the initiator of the project, much like the Linus Torvalds for the Linux
kernel or Richard Stallman for GNU projects, serves as the public representative of
6Windows Live Messenger – http://get.live.com/messenger/overview
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Figure 2.14: SAMBA on Macintosh OS X 10 [63].
Samba. Tridgell proposed The French Cafe´ Technique, also called network analysis, as
the projects overarching approach to reversing the SMB/CIFS protocol family [258].
Samba contributors use a range of techniques and tools beyond test, capture and
stare to support their reverse engineering efforts. Samba contributors developed a
SMB protocol scanner called trans2. It includes dozens of sub-commands, what we
term operators, which implement various types of file and file system queries. The
scanner tries different information levels, data sizes, and object types to determine
what operations exist and what sizes of data are involved [258]. The project also
documents informal protocol reverse engineering techniques that are not detailed in
the other projects. Two of the techniques are trial and error analysis and dual server
and backtracking
2.7.2.1 Trial and Error Analysis. Complex protocols tend to have
many error values [258]. To determine what each error code means Tridgell recom-
mends writing an error driven protocol scanner [258]. Tridgell also recommends an
error mapping approach. As an example, when targeting a file sharing protocol he rec-
ommend modifying the server to return error XXX for filename ’test XXX.dat’, then
asking the proprietary client to access filenames from test 001.dat to test 999.dat.
Finally, the message returned to the client must be collected for analysis. Proxy error
mapping is a technique invented by Andrew Bartlett to discover the correct mapping
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between Microsoft Disk Operating System (MS-DOS) error codes and Windows NT
status codes [258]. Proxy error mapping extends trial and error analysis by inserting
a protocol proxy between the server and client. The proxy contains error codes that
were known from MS-DOS clients (signpost values), performed the same operations
that returned the MS-DOS error codes against reference Windows NT servers. Proxy
error mapping works in this case due to a priori knowledge of the MS-DOS error
codes.
2.7.2.2 Dual Server and Backtracking. The dual server technique
can be used to fine tune understanding of a protocol. The basic concept is to write a
client that connects to a reference server in parallel with the reverse engineered server,
then to systematically generate protocol operations and finally compare the results
from both servers [258]. One problem with this technique is the protocol may have
temporal dependencies between current and past operations. It is possible that both
servers will process several, maybe even thousands, of operations before generating
an error condition. For this reason the operators sent to the dual servers should be
recorded for replay. Suspected erroneous operations can be removed from the replay
and flagged for further consideration if the error condition is not returned by the
reference server. The process of removing suspect operators and replaying is also
referred to as differential analysis [258].
2.7.3 Rdesktop. The rdesktop project, initiated by Matthew Chapman,
implemented an open source client for Windows NT Terminal Server and Windows
2000/2003 Terminal Services [38]. It supports the Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol
(RDP) on several UNIX based platforms with the X Window System (See Figure 2.15).
The RDP protocol is an extension of International Telecommunications Union Stan-
dardization Sector (ITU-T) T.128 multipoint application sharing protocol [38, 170].
This project, unlike Pidgin and Samba, was focused on a single protocol. Even though
Microsoft’s proprietary implementation of the RDP protocol is partially specified in
ITU-T T.128 the project required significant effort because the protocol traffic is en-
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Figure 2.15: Rdesktop Connection.
crypted. Like Samba the project utilized the test, capture, and stare approach to in-
crementally build a working RDP implementation [52,103]. Also, like Samba, project
contributors used protocol filters to conduct MITM attacks that revealed specifics of
Microsofts RDP protocol [82]. The project implemented rdpproxy, an RDP specific
protocol filter, to perform advanced processing of RDP data flows [82].
2.8 State-of-Art
The contributors to the projects discussed in Section 2.7 were highly dependent
on variations of test, capture, and stare. While the Samba project presents additional
adhoc methods such as specialized protocol scanners, proxy servers and partial imple-
mentations of reference servers each method depends on the knowledge incrementally
encoded in their re-implementation of SMB/CIFS. Even after multi-year efforts, the
state-of-practice for protocol reverse engineering has not advanced beyond painstak-
ing, time-intensive, manual scrutiny of packet captures using tools like tcpdump and
Wireshark.
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As discussed in Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, the key data structures and data rela-
tionships we must understand are the protocol automata and operator formats. At its
heart, protocol reverse engineering involves inferring the packet format of operators
and the structure of the protocol automata. The most obvious approach is of course
to access the protocol specification if it is available. Another alternative is to re-
view the source code for the protocol implementation. Unfortunately, many protocols
implementations do not release specifications or source code for public review.
While it is possible to apply RCE techniques to recover an approximation of the
protocol source design we choose not to examine this alternative, instead concentrating
on model recovery from network traces. Regardless, we acknowledge that a robust
protocol reverse engineering effort has much to gain from RCE of the programs that
implement the protocol under consideration. In fact, RCE of source code or binary
code may be the only option if a specification or other documentation is not available.
Furthermore it should be kept in mind that recovery of operators or automata is
limited by the completeness of the captured data flows. If the captured data does not
include a complete sample of the operators used by the protocol we will not be able
to completely construct all the operators or an accurate automaton. Lets examine
current research efforts for protocol format recovery and protocol automata recovery
separately.
2.8.1 Protocol Format Recovery. Building a dictionary of the operators an
application protocol implements requires us to understand the format of the payload
data encapsulated in TCP traffic.
An approach drawing from bio-informatics research is proposed by the PROTOS
protocol genome project [104]. The project intends to utilize automated structure
inference techniques for the purpose of developing automated testing tools. To date
the project has provided only notional results.
A similar concept that crops up when searching on protocol structure inference
is a concept called Protocol Informatics. Protocol Informatics was introduced by a
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security analyst named Marshall Beddoe in 2004. The only remaining evidence of the
effort is a Python7 implementation of some of the concepts available on the Internet
at [18].
Another initiative called Discoverer, from Microsoft Research, uses machine
learning techniques including clustering to infer protocol packet format idioms [58].
The authors evaluated their approach over HTTP, Remote Procedure Call (RPC)
and SMB/CIFS. The authors focused on the correctness, conciseness and coverage of
their format inference leaving automata inference for future work. The inferred packet
formats covered over 95 percent of their captured data flow traffic [58]. Unfortunately,
the algorithms and data sets used in their analysis have not been released to the public.
Borisov et al describe their Generic Application-Level Protocol Analyzer (GAPA)
in [32]. The program implements a protocol specification language (GAPAL) using a
syntax format similar to Augmented BNF. GAPAL is used to prototype application
protocols and supports modeling of the underlying protocol state machine. While
the authors mention that the tool can potentially enable the automatic generation
of vulnerability signatures they do not implement any automated inference of the
underlying protocol format or protocol automata. Also, the GAPA implementation
and GAPAL specification are not publicly available.
Recently, Fisher et al propose automated inference from ad hoc data to generate
PADS data description language [81]. A generic structure discovery algorithm is
presented in Pseudo-ML in [81, Figure 5]. While source for the inference algorithm is
not publicly released an implementation is available through the PADS project web
site8.
2.8.2 Recovering Automata. Automated recovery of protocol models as
different types of automaton has been proposed in various forms through out the last
decade. Message Sequence Charts and Communicating Finite State Machines are two
7Python Programming Language – http://www.python.org/
8PADS project – http://www.padsproj.org
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representations that have been proposed for model recovery by automata synthesis and
automata inference from protocol execution traces. Synthesis differs from inference
in that synthesis uses a complete sample to construct the target automaton. An
inference procedure might not have a complete, or even characteristic, sample to
generate hypothesis automaton.
2.8.2.1 Message Sequence Charts. The use of Message Sequence
Charts (MSC) for communications systems is discussed in detail in ITU-T Z.120 [117].
Alur provides an algorithm for synthesis of MSC and establishes the foundational the-
ory for MSC inference. In Design Recovery from Observations [261]. Ural et al propose
recovery of protocol designs by analysis to build MSC. Their approach recovers a lat-
tice of repetitive sub-functions from a series of observations [121]. After recovery the
lattice is manipulated to synthesize an MSC model. While Ural et al implemented the
synthesis algorithm in C++ they did not implement a trace collection or processing
architecture, instead using generated text files as input to their system [261, Section
4]. If we choose MSC to model recovered protocol designs then the algorithms pre-
sented could serve as an analytical backend for protocol performance properties. The
source code and executables to their implementation are not available to the public.
Another effort that partially solves the problem of protocol model recovery is
Synthesizing Models by Learning from Examples (Smyle)9. MSC inference is applied to
conformance testing by [31] in the Smyle system. MSC are used as inputs to the model
synthesis system. Smyle uses inference learning from MSC to develop a message-
passing automata (MPA) model [31, Definition 3]. Smyle can synthesize a model
from a given labeled scenario (MSC samples marked as positive or negative). The
system uses an extension of Angluin’s L∗ algorithm to support MSC using a LearnLib
(See Section B.3.1) based inference mechanism [31, Section 4]. Unfortunately, Smyle
requires manual creation and labeling of the positive and negative samples. Like
Ural et al, Smyle does not incorporate a trace collection or processing architecture
9Smyle - http://smyle.in.tum.de/
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but could also serve as analytical backend to check performance properties. Smyle
executables are available for research purposes by request. Source code is not made
available at this time due to third party involvement.
Finally, the company Event Helix provides a modified version of Wireshark
to synthesize MSC like graphs from packet traffic at the packet level of granularity
[77]. The product does not support synthesis or inference of application level session
models.
2.8.2.2 Communicating Finite State Machines. While synthesis of
Communicating Finite State Machine (CFSM) from execution traces has been studied
we did not find any attempts at CFSM inference from traces. Saleh [231] proposes
a semi-automatic approach to reverse engineering a communications protocol that
can synthesize a CFSM model of a protocols automata from execution traces. A
network of CFSM consists of a set of FSM which communicate asynchronously over
FIFO channels by sending and receiving typed messages [39, 196]. Each protocol
entity is represented by a CFSM with error-free simplex channels represented by
unbounded FIFO queue [39]. CFSM representation is useful for our problem domain
because they can be checked for non-progress properties by reachability analysis and
reverse reachability analysis [196]. Although CFSM synthesis algorithms are presented
by [231] we did not discover any systems that implement CFSM synthesis or inference.
2.8.2.3 n-Gram and Word Models. The n-gram and word models tech-
niques presented by Rieck and Konrad are focused on anomaly detection for intrusion
detection purposes [216]. In [216] an incoming connection payload x corresponds to
consecutive sequence of symbols from an alphabet Σ. The content of x can be mod-
eled as a set of subsequences w taken from the language L ⊆ Σ∗. The length of w
is denoted by n. The model on n-grams can be derived by defining L = Σn. L is
the language containing all sequences of fixed length n. Provided a set of delimiter
symbols D ⊂ Σ, the model of words defined as L = (Σ \ D)∗ where every w ∈ L
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subsequence of x is delimited by symbols from D. The chosen language L constitutes
the basis for calculating similarity between network connections.
This could be a useful means of converting an input stream into a vector of
values which can be used as a basis of comparison in machine learning techniques
such as kernel methods used by Clark [45,46] (See Section 3.3.2.2).
The n-gram approach strongly parallels grammatical inference techniques. In
fact, stochastic k-TS models are equivalent to n-grams, with n = k [271, Fact 1]. Fur-
thermore, n-gram models have been combined with GI techniques such as MGGI [271]
using k-TS representation and restricted k-TSS automata [268] (See Section 3.10.4.1).
2.8.2.4 Other Approaches. Communicating-X machines [16, 17, 128]
are another possible formal representation but they have not received wide treatment
in respect to formal performance analysis. We did not discover any attempts at
recovery of models as Communicating-X machines. Another formal representation,
Event-Driven Extended Finite State Machine (EEFSM), is presented in [142]. Lee
formally associates the data portion in EEFSM as variables and parameters [142].
The EEFSM construct is used to develop passive testing algorithms for the OSPF
and TCP state machines [142].
One practical application is ScriptGen which is an automated script generation
tool for the Honeyd virtual honeypot 10 [147]. It is designed to monitor, capture, and
analyze packets used by unknown protocols then generate scripts for replay in a hon-
eyd honey pot environment. Unfortunately, the authors do not reveal the particulars
of their implementation.
2.9 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we provided an English languages description of the problem
domain under consideration. Next we discussed distributed systems and issues related
10Honeyd Virtual Honeypot – http://www.honeyd.org/
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to protocol design recovery. Finally, we introduced protocol reverse engineering and
overviewed state-of-practice and state-of-art reverse engineering tools and techniques.
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III. Algorithm Domain
This chapter relates the problem domain of dynamic protocol reverse engineering
from network traces to the algorithm domain of grammatical inference. We intro-
duce Chomsky Hierarchy as a framework for discussing computational learnability.
Next, we develop the symbolic model and mathematical notation that succinctly de-
fines the characteristics of the algorithm domain. Finally, we discuss several existing
algorithmic and heuristic approaches to grammatical inference.
3.1 Design Recovery from Samples of Behavior
Design recovery from samples of behavior has been studied for several purposes:
automated specification mining of instrumented software executables [6] and Java
object behavior mining [59]. Process discovery from samples of behavior (in event logs)
is also studied for discovery of software process models [53] and workflow discovery
[202,235].
3.2 A Language Recognition Problem?
We refer back to our investigative questions presented in Section 1.5:
IQ1 What information is necessary to reverse engineer the control portion of appli-
cation layer protocols from data flows?
IQ2 Given the proven [7,95] difficulty of inferring finite automata from positive sam-
ples only, are there GI approaches that are appropriate for reverse engineering
automata representations of the control portion of application layer protocols
from data flows?
Bhargavan [24] formulates the problem of monitoring interactive devices like
network protocols as a language recognition problem. The authors propose that
given a specification that accepts a certain language of input-output sequences we can
define another language that corresponds to the externally observable input-output
sequences [24]. In essence, can we recover the model of a protocol given examples
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of its behavior? Or more specifically, can we algorithmically turn application level
network traces into automata?
With this background in mind we present aspects of formal language theory
that frame the discussion of the algorithm domain under consideration.
3.3 Formal Languages
While protocol forward engineering efforts can utilize a range of formal models
to represent the protocol under design they often do not [231]. We present aspects
of formal languages to frame the discussion of model recovery for reverse engineering
purposes.
3.3.1 Chomsky Hierarchy. The Chomsky Hierarchy, devised by Noam
Chomsky, as presented in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 is a widely accepted framework
for the discussion of formal representation of grammars and their expressive power.
Informally, a sentence is a string of symbols, a language is a set of sentences, and a
grammar is a (finite) list of rules defining the language [184].
Three basic decision problems for the representations are the questions of [3,110]:
membership - is a given sample sentence a member of a language?
equivalence - are two grammars able to recognize the same language?
emptiness - is the representation empty?
Angluin further expands this list to include the decision problems of [11, Section 1]:
subset - are all elements of a given language also members of another language?
superset - does a given language contain all elements of another language?
disjointness - do two languages have no element in common?
exhaustiveness - is there a member of a given sample that is disjoint from the
possible languages?
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The membership problem for Type-0 is undecidable, Type-1 is decidable, Type-
2 can be determined in polynomial time, and Type-3 in linear time. The equivalence
of Type-0, Type-1, and Type-2 are undecidable. Type-3 can be calculated in poly-
nomial time only when the representation is a DFA1. Even with these restrictions
grammars are useful for studying languages. Grammars give a compact represen-
tation that supports recursivity. Also, grammars support graphical representations
such as automata and parse trees (see Figure 3.2). Finally, even the “easiest” class,
Type-3, contains SAT, boolean functions and parity functions [254].
The representational power of the Chomsky Hierarchy is Type-3 ⊂ Type-2 ⊂
Type-1 ⊂ Type-0. While Type-0, Type-1, and Type-2 based models have higher
representational power they are are more challenging to evaluate for performance
characteristics. There are no efficient means known for generating parsers for Type-
0 or Type-1 languages. Type-2 grammars can be parsed using Earley’s algorithm
with O(n3) time for ambiguous gramamrs, O(n2) for unambiguous, and O(n) for
subcategories [71]. Subcategories of Type-2 grammars that are extensively studied
include k symbol look-ahead parsers like the bottom-up LR(k); and top-down, recur-
sive descent and LL(k) parsers. Where the expressive power is: LL(k) ⊂ LR(k) ⊂
Type-2 [224, Vol 1, Chap 3, Sec 6.8].
Real data, such as network traces, often directly correspond to more complex
languages. Application level protocols, like HTTP [80] and SMTP [113], are frequently
specified in Baukus-Naur Form (BNF) 2 or Augmented BNF [57].
Even so, it is possible to approximate a protocols language with simpler formal
languages. Context-free languages can be approximated by algorithmically generated
DFA [174, 181, 182]. DFA have low representational power but can be analyzed for
performance characteristics within combinatorial limits.
1 For example, the equivalence problem for a Type-3 finite-state transducers is undecidable.
2Backus normal form or Backus-Naur form [130] is a widely used alternative representation for
context-free grammars.
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Figure 3.1: Chomsky Hierarchy [184].
Table 3.1: Chomsky Hierarchy. [159]
Chomsky Hierarchy
Type Languages Automaton Production rules
Type-0 Recursively enu-
merable
Turing Machine (unrestricted or phrase
structure)
α → β (α, β ∈ (V ∪ Σ)∗, α contains a
variable )
Type-1 Context-sensitive Linear-bounded non-deterministic
Turning Machine
α → β (α, β ∈ (V ∪ Σ)∗,|β| ≥ |α|, α
contains a variable )
Type-2 Context-free Non-deterministic pushdown automa-
ton
A→ α (A ∈ V, α ∈ (V ∪ Σ)∗)
Type-3 Regular Finite state automaton A→ αB,A→ a (A,B ∈ V, a ∈ Σ)
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Table 3.2: SMTP Sender Transitions.
States (Q)
Operators (Σ) INITIAL (q0) CONN ESTABLISHED TRANSACTION STARTED DATA TRANSFER
DATA - - DATA TRANSFER -
HELO - CONN ESTABLISHED TRANSACTION STARTED -
MAIL - TRANSACTION STARTED - -
NOOP - CONN ESTABLISHED TRANSACTION STARTED -
QUIT - INITIAL INITIAL -
RCPT - - TRANSACTION STARTED -
RSET - - CONN ESTABLISHED -
end-of-data∗ - - - CONN ESTABLISHED
more-data∗ - - - DATA TRANSFER
open∗ CONN ESTABLISHED - - -
Protocol state can be represented by grammars, such as context-free or finite
state automata, drawn from the Chomsky Hierarchy. If we select Type-3, in effect,
each endpoint of the communication is a tuple A = 〈Q,Σ, δ, q0, F 〉. Q is a finite set
of states. Σ is a finite set of symbols to label the transitions, known as the alphabet.
Σ is the finite set of verbs or operators in the protocol vocabulary that lead to state
transitions. Protocol operators must follow the syntactical format of the protocol.
The results of protocol operators are the transitions represented by δ. Where δ, the
partial mapping from Q× Σ into Q, represents all transitions.
For a simple finite automaton representation of a protocol we define the two
endpoints of a protocol as the sender represented by tuple S = 〈Qs,Σ, δs, qs0, Fs〉 and
receiver represented by R = 〈Qr,Σ, δr, qr0, Fr〉. Note that S and R share the same set
of operators Σ. The structure of a distributed systems communication is determined
by the syntactic format of the protocol operators that make up the finite set Σ.
As an example Figure 3.2 shows the states and operators for the sender of a
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP). The figure depicts four states, the operators
and resulting state transitions.
Mapping Figure 3.2 to a DFA results in the following:
Q = {INITIAL,DATA TRANSFER,CONN ESTQABLISHED, TRANSACTION STARTED}
Σ = {HELO,NOOP,QUIT,MAIL,RSET,END OF DATA,RCPT}
q0 = {INITIAL}
F = {INITIAL}
The transition function represented by δ is shown in Table 3.2.
43
Figure 3.2: State Diagram for SMTP Sender.
It must be noted that the operators marked with ∗ in Table 3.2 indicate tran-
sitions that must be inferred from the TCP transport service level even though they
are shown in Figure 3.2. Also, the DFA representation does not have to account for
issues such as connection loss or timeout relegating these issues to the underlying
TCP transport layer.
3.3.2 Other Formal Reperesentations. Alternative frameworks for language
representation include pattern languages [8] [224, Chapter 6] and categorial grammars
[124]. Various other constructs have been proposed that parallel and cross-cut the
Chomsky hierarchy. Two examples are Petri nets and planar languages.
3.3.2.1 Petri nets. Petri nets are another mechanism for representing
communicating systems that have analogy to the Chomsky hierarchy. Petri nets have
high representational power but formal performance analysis can be more difficult.
Petri net variations were used by van der Aalst [266] for workflow mining and dis-
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covering social networks [265]. Mayo [162] proposes a hill-climbing technique to learn
Petri net models of gene interactions.
3.3.2.2 Planar languages. Clark presents grammatical inference of
planar languages using string kernel methods in [45,46]. Planar languages cut across
the Chomsky Hierarchy for simple-subsequence kernels [46]. The method was able to
learn some context-sensitive and mildly context-sensitive languages. Artificial data
sets and Matlabr source code are available at the Grammatical Inference with String
Kernels project web site [43].
3.4 Learning Automata Representation of a Language
The process of learning an automata can be expressed as a decision problem:
Given an integer n and two disjoint sets of words S+ and S− over a finite alphabet Σ,
does there exist a DFA consistent with S+ and S− with a number of states less than
or equal to n. The learning process is defined formally in Definition 3.4.1.
Definition 3.4.1 (Grammar Induction [41] ). A general definition of grammar in-
duction is given sets of labeled example string S+ and S− such that S+ ⊂ L(G) and
S− ⊂ L′(G) infer a DFA (A) such that the language of A denoted L(A) = L(G) is a
language generated from an unknown Type-3 grammar (G). Its complement, L′(G),
is defined as L′(G) = Σ∗ − L(G) where Σ∗ is the set of all strings over the alphabet
(Σ) of L(G).
Learning automata representation of languages by grammar induction is a widely
researched topic. Miclet provides an introduction in [36, Chapter 9]. A survey to 1994
is presented by Vidal in [270]. A contemporary (2005) bibliographic survey of the field
is presented by de la Higuera in [61].
3.5 Computational Learnability Models
There are three major formal models established in the computational learning
community for learning grammar structure from examples or grammatical inference:
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Figure 3.3: Gold’s Enumeration Procedure - the decision la-
beled Consistent determines if the current grammar is consistent
with the sample presented so far. Once the learner enters loop
A it converges to the target language in the limit [201, Figure
1].
Gold’s identification in the limit, Angluin’s query learning model, and Valiant’s prob-
ably approximately correct (PAC) learning model.
3.5.1 Identification in the Limit. Gold [95] proposed his identification in
the limit model in the late 1960’s. Gold’s model describes a learning process where
an infinite sequence of examples from a grammar G is presented to the inference
algorithm M . Figure 3.3 outlines Gold’s enumeration procedure. The decision labeled
Consistent determines if the current grammar is consistent with the sample presented
so far. Once the learner enters the loop, denoted A, it converges to the target language
in the limit. The eventual limiting behavior of the algorithm is used as the criterion
of its success. Gold also shows that there is no general method of language inference
from positive samples that will do better than enumeration [95]. Although Gold
establishes the theoretical tractability of grammar induction from positive samples he
does not provide algorithmic methods other than exhaustive enumeration.
46
3.5.2 Query Learning Model. Angluin developed the L∗ algorithm to learn
regular languages based on queries and counterexamples [10]. The inference algorithm
is assumed to have access to an expert teacher, like an oracle. The teacher can answer
specific queries, membership and equivalence, asked about an unknown grammar G.
The teacher answers a membership query with an input string w ∈ Σ∗ with an output
of “yes” if w is generated by G and “no” otherwise. An equivalence query takes an
input grammar G′ and the output is “yes” if the G′ generates the same language as G
and “no” otherwise. In the case where the answer is “no” a string w in the symmetric
difference of the language L(G) generated by G and the language L(G′) generated by
G′ is returned. The returned w is a counterexample.
In the inference from a protocol trace the equivalence test can at best be ap-
proximated while membership queries can be answered by testing the protocol under
inspection [101,247].
Angluin’s query learning method is extensively studied. Tradeoff of equivalence
and membership queries is discussed by Balca´zar et al [14]. A proof technique for
demonstrating the hardness of learning by queries regardless of representation is es-
tablished by Aizenstein, Hegedu˝s, Hellerstein and Pitt in [4]. Raffelt [211] further
extends the L∗ algorithm to deal with Mealy machines. The problem of identifying
a value  > 0, where 1 −  is the probability that the oracle answers correctly (or
if already asked, consistently) is left as an open question in the field of grammatical
inference [62].
3.5.3 PAC Learning Model. Valiant [263] introduced probably approxi-
mately correct learning which is a distribution independent probabilistic model of
learning from random examples. The inference algorithm takes a sample as input
and produces a grammar as output. A successful inference algorithm is one that with
high probability (at least 1 − δ) finds a grammar whose error is small (less than ).
Haussler provides an introduction to PAC learning in [102]. Furthermore, Angluin
has shown that an equivalence query algorithm can be translated into a PAC learning
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model [11, Section 2.4]. In fact, DFA are not PAC learnable unless we are allowed to
ask membership queries on an oracle [11].
3.6 Tractability
Gold [95] and Angluin [7] proved that when using passive learning the problem of
finding the smallest automaton consistent with a set of accepted and rejected strings is
NPC. Golds Theorem states that inference on all regular languages is impossible with
only positive samples. Gold further showed that exact identification from sparsely
labeled samples is NPC. The difficulty of the problem was further established by Pitt
and Warmuth [203,205] as well as Pitt and Valiant [204]. While this does not prevent
a solution it does mean the solution will likely require approximation or heuristic
techniques. In fact, Lang [137] demonstrated experimental evidence that the average
case is tractable and Freund et al [88] proved the average case is polynomial.
3.7 Search Approaches for Grammar Induction
Given the tractability of grammar induction from positive samples regardless of
representation Vidal proposes three classes of search for grammar induction: meth-
ods that use additional information, characterizeable methods, and heuristic meth-
ods [271]. We re-define Vidal’s first class as extrinsic methods. For extrinsic methods
the additional information extrinsic to the target model includes negative samples,
equivalence queries or probabilistic information. While characterizeable methods con-
centrate on subclasses of regular languages that are shown to be learnable from posi-
tive samples. And, finally, heuristic methods which make direct use of a priori intrinsic
knowledge of the target model such as the syntactic constraints of the language.
Muggleton also discusses the use of additional information (i.e. negative sam-
ples, limiting the number of states in target automata, or assigning statistical val-
ues to rank target automata [177, p.121].) Muggleton proposes the use of semantic
information, similar to what we term intrinsic information, from the positive sam-
ples [177, Section 6.7].
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The selection of search approach methodology is driven by what is known about
the language under consideration. A composition of the three approaches might be
appropriate if we have more than one type of knowledge (extrinsic, characterizeable,
or intrinsic) available.
3.8 Notations and Definitions
Before we discuss specific algorithms we present the formal notation and defini-
tions that will be used3. The definitions provided are derived from [9], [177, Appendix
B], [271], [131], [37], [55], [41], and [62]. In general we favor the format used by [9]
and [55]. Formally defining the mathematical symbology allows us to discuss the
selected algorithm domain in a more compact form.
Definition 3.8.1 (Strings [62]). A string w over Σ is a finite sequence w = a1a2a3 . . . an
of letters. Let |w| denote the length of w. Letters of Σ will be indicated by a, b, c, . . .,
strings over Σ by u, v, . . . , z, and the empty string by λ. Let Σ∗ be the set of all finite
strings over alphabet Σ
Definition 3.8.2 (Languages [62]). A language L is any set of strings, so therefore
L ⊆ Σ∗. Operations over languages include: set operations (union, intersection,
complement); product L1 · L2 = {uv : u ∈ L1, v ∈ L2}; powerset L0 = λLn1 = Ln · L;
and star L∗ = ∪i∈NLi. We denote by L or A a class of languages.
Algebraic laws for languages are discussed in texts on formal languages (e.g.
[3, 110,159,224]).
Definition 3.8.3 (Learning Sample of a Language [55] ). A learning sample S of a
language L is a finite multi-set of words from L. That is ∀w ∈ S,w ∈ L.
Definition 3.8.4 (Finite State Automaton). A finite state automaton (FSA), A is
a quintuple A = 〈Q,Σ, δ, I, F 〉, where Q is a finite set of states,Σ is a finite set of
3The reader is referred to texts on formal languages (e.g. [3, 110, 159, 224]) if they require back-
ground detail.
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symbols to label the transitions, known as the alphabet, δ is a partial mapping from
S × Σ→ S, I ⊂ Q is the set of start states, and F ⊂ Q is the set of final states.
The size of the automaton is defined as the total number of states in Q denoted
by |Q|, that is |A| = |Q|.
PrefA(q) will denote the prefix language of a state q defined by PrefA(q) =
{w ∈ Σ∗|q ∈ (q0, w)} [55, Definition 1].
SuffA(q) will denote the suffix language of a state q defined by PrefA(q) =
{w ∈ Σ∗|δ(q, w) ∩ F 6= ∅} [55, Definition 1].
The FSA is minimized if no pair of states are equivalent. Given qi, qj ∈ Q, i 6= j,
there is an input word x that distinguishes them such that δ(qi, x) 6= δ(qj, x).
Definition 3.8.5 (Deterministic Finite State Automaton). A FSA is deterministic
or a deterministic finite state automaton (DFA) ∀q ∈ Q,∀a ∈ Σ, δ(q, a) has at most
one element otherwise the FSA is non-deterministic. Additionally, |I| = 1 with the
start state denoted by q0 where q0 is the single element of I.
Definition 3.8.6 (Acceptance [55]). An acceptance for a word w ∈ Σ∗, where w =
a1a2a3 . . . a|w|, in an automaton A = 〈Q,Σ, δ, q0, F 〉 is a sequence (q0, . . . , q|w|)w of
|w| + 1 states such that q0 ∈ Q,∀i ∈ [1, |w|], qi ∈ δ(qi−1, ai),q|w| ∈ F . q0 is said to be
the initial state and q|w| is said to be the final state of the acceptance. Transitions
qi−1, ai, qi are said reached by the acceptance. The set of acceptances of a word w in
automaton A is denoted by AccA(w).
Definition 3.8.7 (Regular Grammar). A regular grammar is a grammar in which
all of the productions are of the form A → aB or A → λ. Given a finite automaton
A = 〈Q,Σ, δ, q0, F 〉, it is possible to construct a regular grammar G = 〈N, T, P, S〉
such that L(A) = L(G) as follows. For each state in Q add a non-terminal of the
same name to N . For each symbol in Σ add an equivalent symbol to T . Let S be the
non-terminal named q0. For each q ∈ F add a production to P of the form q → λ. For
each transition of the form δ(q1, a) = q2 add a production to P of the form q1 → aq2.
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Definition 3.8.8 (Regular Languages). The transition function δ of a DFA can be
extended to Σ∗ : δ(q, λ) = q and δ(q, a.w) = δ(δ(q, a), w) for all q ∈ Q, a ∈ Σ,
w ∈ Σ∗. Let L(A) denote the language recognized by the automaton A : L(A) =
{w ∈ Σ∗|δ(q0, w) ∈ F} By definition the language L(A) accepted by a DFA A is a
regular language. That is the class of regular languages can be defined as the class of
languages accepted by a finite automata.
Definition 3.8.9 (Type-3 Grammar [41] ). A Type-3 Grammar is a four-tuple G =
〈T,N, P, S〉 where:
• T ⊆ N is a finite non-empty set called the terminal alphabet of G,
• N is a finite non-empty set called the total vocabulary of G,
• P is a finite set of production rules,
• S ∈ (N − T ) is referred to as the start state, and the rules in P are of the form
A→ aB or A→ a, where A,B ∈ (N − T ) and a ∈ T
Definition 3.8.10 (Canonical Automaton [55] ). A Canonical Automaton (CA) of a
language L, denoted by CA(L) is the sole minimal DFA accepting L.
Definition 3.8.11 (Universal Automaton [55] ). A Universal Automaton (UA) of a
language L, denoted by UA(L) is the canonical automaton A(Σ∗) accepting all words
w ∈ Σ.
Definition 3.8.12 (Maximal Canonical Automaton [55]). A Maximal Canonical Au-
tomaton (MCA) related to a learning sample S, denoted by MCA(S) or more simply
MCA, is the union for each word w of learning sample S from a canonical automata
A ({w}). A MCA is a star-like automaton that exactly recognizes data from sample
S.
Definition 3.8.13 (Partition of set S [177]). A partition of set S, denoted by piS, is
a set of pairwise disjoint non-empty subsets of set S s.t. the union of all piS is equal
to S.
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Definition 3.8.14 (Block [177]). The unique block of piS containing s, where s ∈ S
is denoted B(s, piS).
Definition 3.8.15 (Refines [177]). Given two partitions, pi and pi
′
pi refines pi
′
iff
every block of pi
′
is a union of blocks of pi.
Definition 3.8.16 (Prefix Tree Acceptor [55]). A Prefix Tree Acceptor (PTA) on a
sample S, PTA(S) or PTA, is the deterministic automaton obtained when merging
every state of MCA(S) with identical prefix languages.
A PTA is a FSA that can be constructed by laying out the strings in a language
using a state to represent each unique prefix of one of the strings. A language accepted
by a PTA is regular and exactly accepts all strings in a given language.
Figure 3.4 shows the PTA for POP3 client commands sent to servers from week
1 day 1 inside IDEVAL traffic.
Definition 3.8.17 (Augmented Prefix Tree Acceptor [41] ). A Augmented Prefix Tree
Acceptor (APTA) is a six-tuple G = 〈Q,Σ, δ, s, F+, F−〉 where:
• Q is a finite non-empty set of nodes,
• Σ is a finite non-empty set of input symbols or input alphabet,
• δ : Q× Σ→ Q the transition function,
• s ∈ Q the start or root node,
• F+ ⊆ Q identifies final nodes of strings in S+,
• F− ⊆ Q identifies final nodes of strings in S−,
The size of an APTA is defined as the total number of elements in Q denoted |Q|.
Definition 3.8.18 (APTA node equivalence [41]). Two nodes qi and qj in an APTA
are considered not equivalent if and only if:
• (qi ∈ F+ ∧ qj ∈ F−) ∨ (qi ∈ F− ∧ qj ∈ F+), or
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Figure 3.4: Example PTA - Command PTA for POP3 from
Week 1 Day 1 inside IDEVAL traffic.
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• ∃s ∈ Σ such that if (qi, s, qi′) ∈ δ,(qj, s, qj′) ∈ δ then qi′ is not equivalent to qj′ .
Definition 3.8.19 (Strictly locally testable languages [37]). Let k be a positive inte-
ger. For w ∈ Σ+ of length ≥ k, let Lk(w),Rk(w), and Ik(w) be respectively the prefix
length k, the suffix length k and the set of interior factors of length k of the word w.
L ⊆ Σ∗ is strictly k-testable if and only if there exist three sets X, Y, Z of words on Σ
such that for all w ∈ Σ+, |w| ≥ k, w ∈ L iff Lk(w) ∈ X,Rk(w) ∈ Y , and Ik(w) ⊆ Z.
A language is strictly locally testable if it is strictly k-testable for some k > 0. We
denote the class of strictly locally testable languages as sLT .
Definition 3.8.20 (Left Quotient [9, 131, 177]). Let L be any language. Pre(L) The
set of all prefixes of elements of language L.
For any w ∈ Σ∗, we denote the left-quotient of language L and word w by w \L.
That is w \ L = {x ∈ Σ∗|wx ∈ L}. Angluin introduced the equivalence relation ∼=L
over Σ∗ defined as: w1 ∼=L w2 iff w1 \ L = w2 \ L. A language L is regular iff the
number of equivalence classes of ∼=L is finite.
Definition 3.8.21 (k-tails [177]). The k-tails of word w in language L denoted by
w \k L is the set {v : v ∈ w \ L, |v| ≤ k}. That is, the k-tail is the set of all words in
the language that are members of the left quotient with a depth of no more than k.
Definition 3.8.22 (k-reversible Languages [9, 131]). A language L is pseudo k-
reversible iff whenever u1uw and u2uw are in L and |v| = k , u1 ∼=L u2v holds.
A language L is k-reversible iff L is regular and pseudo-k-reversible. For any non-
negative integer k, we denote the class of k-reversible languages by Revk. It is known
that for any non-negative integer k, the class Revk is properly contained in the class
Revk+1.
3.9 Grammatical Inference Algorithms
Several algorithms exist for inferring grammars for language understanding.
The algorithms have been used in a range of GI tasks including machine learning, for-
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Table 3.3: Regular Inference Algorithms.
Regular Inference Algorithms
Algorithm Negative Samples
Required
Target Automaton
Trakhtenbrot and Barzdin Yes DFA
ECGI No DFA, PFSA [269, Section 2.2]
k-TSSI No k-testable DFA
k-RI Angluin Optional k-reversible DFA
k-RI Muggleton Optional uniquely τ-terminated k-reversible DFA
MGGI No DFA
RIG and BRIG Yes DFA
RPNI Yes DFA
EDSM Yes DFA
mal language theory, structural recognition, natural language processing, and speech
recognition [61].
Algorithms can be classified according to their target language/grammar: Type-
3, regular; Type-2, context-free; Type-1, context-sensitive; or Type-0, phrase struc-
ture (see Figure 3.1). Algorithms can also be characterized according to the classes
discussed in Section 3.7, that is: extrinsic, characterizable, or heuristic. The main
types of extrinsic information we are concerned with are negative samples, and queries.
3.10 Inference of Regular Languages (Type-3)
Inference of regular languages is well studied. Muggleton provides an intro-
duction to regular inference in [177, Chap 6]. Gronfors [99] conducts experimental
analysis of several of algorithms for generality. Dupont presents an early look at the
search space of regular inference in [70]. Hingston describes various approaches to
develop a family of regular inference algorithms [106]. Coste and Fredouille provide a
discussion of the search space of inference of DFA, NFA, and unambiguous finite au-
tomaton in [55]. While Coste et al [54] discuss the importance of domain and typing
background knowledge to tune inference algorithms.
The limitations on inference of the union of multiple languages from intermixed
samples is discussed by [278] who refines Angluin’s necessary and sufficient conditions
for inference. Given that we do not know if application protocol languages meet
the conditions defined by [278] we will not further consider intermixed samples for
bilingual inference.
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Table 3.4: Regular Inference Algorithm Performance.
Regular Inference Algorithm Performance
Algorithm O() Notes
Trakhtenbrot and Barzdin O(mn2) where m = |initial APTA|, n = number
of states in the final hypothesis automa-
ton.
ECGI not characterized experimental evidence from [227].
k-TSSI O(kn logn) where n is the sum of the lengths of all
the strings in S+ [89].
k-RI Angluin O((k + 1)2n3) [9, Theorem 35] where n is the sum of the lengths of all
strings in the sample.
k-RI Muggleton O(n2) [177, Section 6.5] where n is the sum of the lengths of all
strings in the sample.
MGGI not characterized
RIG and BRIG non-polynomial experimental evidence from [169, Sec-
tion 3.5]
RPNI O((m +m′)m2) where m is the sum of the length of all
strings in S+ and m
′ is the sum of the
length of all strings in S−
EDSM not characterized
Table 3.3 summarizes the characteristics of several algorithms used for inference
of regular languages. Table 3.4 summarizes the performance characteristics of several
of the algorithms discussed.
3.10.1 Statistical Extrinsic Methods. Muggleton provides a framework to
represent several statistical extrinsic methods to determine state merges by defining
a generalized algorithm using a predicate function χ(u, v) [177, Appendix C]. The
generalized algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1, where χ(u, v) takes values shown in
Table 3.5 for some k-tails algorithms.
Input: S+ non-empty set of positive sample strings
Output: The acceptor A0/piPr(S+)
/*Initialization */
/*A0 is a DFA represented by 〈Q0,Σ, δ0, I0, F0〉 */
Let A0 = FormPTA(S+);1.1
Let pi0 be the trivial partition of Q0;1.2
Let i = 0;1.3
/*Merging */
for ∀(u, v) ∈ Q0 do1.4
if χ(u, v) then1.5
Let B1 = B(u, pii);1.6
Let B2 = B(v, pii);1.7
Let pii+1 be pii with B1 and B2 merged;1.8
Increment i by 1;1.9
end1.10
end1.11
/*Termination */
Let f = i;1.12
return The acceptor A0/pif1.13
Algorithm 1: Muggleton Algorithm IM1 [177, p.100]
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Table 3.5: Muggleton Predicate Functions χ(u, v) for k-tails. [177, Appendix C]
Muggleton Predicate Functions for k-tails
Source χ(u, v)
Biermann and Feldman [28]
χ(u, v) =

true u \k S+ = v \k S+
false otherwise
ff
Levine [148]
χ(u, v) =

true Stren(u, v) > Strn
false otherwise
ff
, where
Stren(u, v) =
max
i
"
2|u \i S+ ∩ v \i S+|
|u \i S+| + |v \i S+|
#
, i ∈ Z +
, and
Stren[0, 1] ∈ R
Miclet [168]
χ(u, v) =

true u \ S+ ∩ v \ S+ 6= ∅
false otherwise
ff
Another statistical extrinsic method, Minimal Descriptor Length (MDL) as pre-
sented by [146], also fits into the Muggleton predicate form but does not use k-tails.
Instead
χ(u, v) =
 true {|DFA′|+ |DFA′(S+)|} ≤ {|DFA|+ |DFA(S+)|}false otherwise

, where DFA is initially the PTA of S+ and DFA
′ is the hypothesis DFA. DFA‘
replaces DFA for each successful iteration.
3.10.2 Extrinsic Negative Sample Support Methods. Several algorithms exist
that require extrinsic negative sample support including: Trakhtenbrot and Barzdin’s
algorithm; Miclet’s Regular Inference of Grammars, and Regular Positive and Nega-
tive Inference.
3.10.2.1 Trakhtenbrot and Barzdin. One of the earliest algorithms
was proposed by Trakhtenbrot and Barzdin4 [41]. We classify the algorithm as an
4We were unable locate a copy of the original presentation by Trakhtenbrot and Barzdin in [256].
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extrinsic method because it was designed for completely labeled data sets containing
both positive and negative examples. According to Cicchello [41, Section 10.1.3]:
The upper bound on the runtime is mn2, where m is the total number of
nodes in the initial APTA and n is the total number of states in the final
hypothesis.
Cicchello presents a modification that supports use of the algorithm with incomplete
training sets in [41].
3.10.2.2 Regular Inference of Grammars. Regular Inference of Gram-
mars (RIG) requires extrinsic negative sample support [169]. Miclet also presents
Boosted beam-search Regular Inference of Grammars (BRIG). BRIG also requires
extrinsic negative sample support [169]. Miclet describes both RIG and BRIG as in-
efficient [169, Section 3.5] and concludes from experimental results that the algorithms
are non-polynomial [169, Section 5].
3.10.2.3 Regular Positive and Negative Inference. Regular Positive
and Negative Inference (RPNI) requires extrinsic negative sample support. The al-
gorithm was proposed by Lang [137] and independently by Oncina and Garc´ia [189].
The RPNI algorithm has been shown to identify in the limit regular languages. The
complexity is a function of the positive and negative sample sizes. RPNI has an up-
date time of O((m + m′)m2) where m is the sum of the length of all positive data
(S+) and m
′ is the sum of the length of all negative data (S−).
RPNI works by starting with the PTA, and merging pairs of states if possible,
using a fixed depth-first ordering of state pairs. The algorithm runs in polynomial
time and is guaranteed to identify the target FSA given complete sample data.
One limiting factor of the RPNI algorithm is that it requires presentation of the
entire positive and negative sample data. If new data is available the inference process
must be restarted. A modification to allow for incremental inference was proposed
by Dupont [69]. The algorithm is modified to support noisy samples and presented
as RPNI∗ by [237]. More recently, Hoffman provides experimental evidence that
58
prohibiting some of the merges performed by the original RPNI algorithm improved
performance against artificial random data sets [107].
3.10.2.4 Evidence Driven State Merging. Evidence Driven State Merg-
ing (EDSM) requires extrinsic negative sample support. The basic algorithm is de-
scribed by Lang in [138]. EDSM performs merges in arbitrary order such that both
nodes in a merge might be the roots of arbitrary subgraphs of the hypothesis automa-
ton [138]. To overcome this a modification to EDSM called the blue-fringe algorithm
restricts the merge order [138] using a policy described by [123]. The algorithm is
further modified to support noisy samples and presented as BLUE∗ by [237] as part
of the Learning DFA form Noisy Samples competition [153] for the GECCO2004
conference [262].
3.10.3 Characterizeable Methods. Given Gold’s result that regular languages
cannot be inferred in the limit from only positive data [95] the search for character-
izable subclasses that can be inferred with only positive data has become a kind of
“holy-grail” of grammatical inference. Many subclasses of regular languages have
been proposed: strictly regular languages [284], k-reversible [9], locally testable lan-
guages in the strict sense [89], code regular languages [74], and Szilard languages of
regular grammars [156,282].
Figure 3.5 shows some of the families of languages that are classified within
regular languages. Two well studied characterizable methods are k-Testable in the
Strict Sense Inference and k-Reversible Inference.
3.10.3.1 k-Testable in the Strict Sense Inference. The inductive infer-
ence of the class of k-Testable languages in the strict sense was proposed by Garcia
and Vidal in 1990 [89]. A language that is k-Testable in the Strict Sense of Inference
(k-TSSI) is defined by a finite set of substrings of length k that are permitted in the
target language [89]. This algorithm is a characterizable method that limits the target
model to k-testable languages.
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Figure 3.5: Some Families of Regular Languages [271].
A k-testable languages in the strict sense (k-TSSL) a subclass of k-testable
languages. It is essentially defined by a finite set of substrings of length k that are
permitted to appear in the strings of the language. Given a positive learning sample
S+ of strings of an unknown language, a deterministic finite-state automaton that
recognizes the smallest k-TSSL containing S+ is obtained.
The the number of transitions in the inferred automaton is bounded by O(m)
where m is the number of substrings defining the k-TSSL, and the inference algorithm
works in O(kn log n) where n is the sum of the lengths of all the strings in S+ [89,
Theorem 6.1].
Torres and Varona [255] presents a low-level representation of k-TSS structures
proposed for use in continuous speech recognition. Varona and Torres also conducted
experimental analysis with k values of 4 and 5 on smoothed stochastic FSA for con-
tinuous speech recognition [268].
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Experiments by [89, Section VIII] show the ability of (stochastic) k-TSSLs to
approach other classes of regular languages. An algorithm for k-TSSI is outlined
in [89, Figure 1].
3.10.3.2 k-Reversible Inference. k-Reversible Inference (k-RI), intro-
duced by Angluin, does not require negative sample support [9]. Like, k-TSSI, k-RI
is a characterizable method restricting the target automaton to k-reversible regular
languages [9].
The class of k-reversible regular languages is a subset of the regular languages
with the properties explained in Definition 3.8.22. The target language must be k-
reversible for some k ≥ 0. The k-RI algorithm identifies the minimum k-reversible
language containing any finite positive sample in O((k + 1)2n3) time, where n is the
summation of the lengths of the strings in the sample [9, Theorem 35].
This was later reduced by Muggleton to O(n2) time with the added restriction
that the target automaton is uniquely terminated, that is the automaton is a uniquely
τ -terminated acceptor [177, Section 6.5]. A uniquely τ -terminated acceptor is a FSA
with the property that any transition arc is labled with the termination symbol τ if
it leads to an acceptor state and that the acceptor state has no outgoing arcs [177,
Section 6.5.1].
3.10.4 Heuristic Methods. Heuristic methods leverage intrinsic knowledge of
the target automata. Heuristic methods concentrate on producing a target model that
is useful for a problem domain not necessarily considering the automata’s membership
in a language theoretic characterizable class. Algorithms in this category include:
Morphic Generator Grammatical Inference, the Burge algorithm, Continuous Time
Markov Chain models, and kBehavior.
3.10.4.1 Morphic Generator Grammatical Inference. Morphic Gen-
erator Grammatical Inference (MGGI) does not require extrinsic negative sample
support. The inference procedure was introduced by Garcia as the “Local Language
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Inference Algorithm” [90]. Sanchis discusses the use of MCGI for inferring phonetic
units [232]. Vidal outlines the learning approach for MGGI regular inference in [271]
but does not provide an algorithmic implementation.
MGGI works with two finite alphabets, Σ and Σ
′
and a set of positive sample
strings S+ ⊂ Σ∗ [271]. A function g is used to rename the words in S+ resulting in
S
′
+ = g(S+) where S
′
+ ⊂ Σ∗ [271]. The corresponding 2−TS language is obtained from
S
′
+ and another renaming function h is applied [271]. The MGGI inferred language
is L = h(l(g(S
′
+))). The renaming function is the morphic generator which allows for
generalization of the language under consideration. The renaming function relies on
extrinsic knowledge of the model under consideration.
We did not discover a formal analysis of the performance characteristics of
MGGI. We did discover experimental empirical results specific to speech recognition
in [232, 271]. Local language learning, similar to MGGI, is applied to DNA sequence
analysis by [283].
3.10.4.2 Burge. The Burge algorithm5, which does not require nega-
tive samples, is presented by Ingham in [114, 115]. The algorithm is O(nm) where n
is the number of samples in the training set and m is the average number of tokens
in a sample [114, Section 3.9]. Ingham presents modification to the algorithm to sup-
port incremental learning of DFA models from tokenized HTTP requests. While [115]
does generate a notional model of the HTTP request the focus is on approximation
of HTTP for intrusion detection not model recovery.
3.10.4.3 Continuous Time Markov Chains. Sen et al examine the use
of grammatical inference inspired algorithms to learn edge labled Continuous Time
Markov Chains [238]. Java source code for their implementation is available.
5John Burge is a co-author of [115].
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3.10.4.4 kBehavior. The k-tails approach is modified by Mariani
and Pezze´ and presented as kBehavior which is an incremental approach designed
for limited storage capacity [158, Section 2]. The technique uses a heuristic to merge
multiple states that are recognized as a common behavior instead of individual states.
This is in part to improve branch and loop detection from execution traces.
3.10.5 Hybrid Methods. There are several randomized and heuristic ap-
proaches to regular language inference that do not neatly fit into our categories of
extrinsic, characterizeable, or heuristic. If we have both intrinsic and extrinsic infor-
mation hybrid methods are possible. One such method is Angluin’s L∗ algorithm,
another is Error Correcting Grammatical Inference.
3.10.5.1 Angluin’s L∗ Algorithm. Angluin also presents a modification
to the k-RI algorithm using both extrinsic negative samples and queries [9, Section 7].
An overview of Angluin’s L∗ algorithm is presented by Berg in [23]. Berg discusses
evaluation of L∗ (as presented by Angluin 1987 [10]) for prefix-closed DFA6 against
random samples and real world examples drawn from the Edinburgh Concurrency
Workbench7 [23].
3.10.5.2 Error Correcting Grammatical Inference. Error Correcting
Grammatical Inference (ECGI) proposed by Rulot and Vidal is a GI heuristic that
incrementally infers the target automata model [226]. ECGI combines statistical
extrinsic methods and heuristic methods.
The approach, which does not require negative sample support, is based on error
correcting parsing. The ECGI algorithm builds a hypothesis automaton by initially
creating a trivial automaton from the first presented sample word [226]. States and
transitions are added to the hypothesis automaton for every new unrecognized sample
[226]. Error correcting parsing is used to determine what states and transitions to add
6A languages L is prefix-closed if ∀w ∈ L, then ∀PrefL(w) ∈ L [136, Definition 3.2].
7Edinburgh Concurrency Workbench – http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/perdita/cwb/.
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by searching for the best path for the input sample in the hypothesis automaton [226].
A statistical extrinsic method, such as Hamming or Levenshtein distance, can be used
to measure which path is best. Heuristic restrictions eliminate loops and circuits in
the inferred hypothesis automaton.
We did not discover a formal analysis of the performance characteristics of
ECGI. We did discover experimental empirical results specific to speech recognition
in [232].
The ECGI algorithm has also been applied in language modeling [209] and
parts-of-speech tagging [206,207]. Sanchis also discusses the use of ECGI for inferring
phonetic units [232]. Rulot also proposes an extension to the ECGI algorithm [226]
to support stochastic target automata. The stochastic extension is expanded by [269,
Section 2.2].
3.10.5.3 Other Approaches. Graine [97] introduces a method for learn-
ing regular languages with constant alphabet sizes using neural networks. The method
is O(n2) time complexity for k-reversible regular languages. Giordano examines in-
ference of regular languages by a tabu search that requires both positive and negative
examples [92]. Belz proposes a genetic algorithm for automata inference [21]. Ni-
parnan [183] and Lai [136] also examine genetic algorithm approaches to inference of
finite automata.
3.11 Inference of Higher Order Languages
Gramatical inference of context-free languages (Type-2) has received some at-
tention. Early work was conducted by [228] and [60]. Lee [145] provides a circa
1994 survey of literature to that point. The 2004 Omphalos Context-Free Language
Learning Competition held in conjunction with the 7th International Colloquium on
Grammatical Inference [246] generated experimental results for artificially generated
data. More recently Oates [187] studied k-reversible CFG, Nakamura presented an
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incremental CFG learning algorithm [179], while Petasis [197] and Javed [120] both
propose genetic algorithm approaches.
Non-terminally separated languages (NTS) a subclass of deterministic context-
free languages (where Type-3 ⊂ NTS ⊂ Type-2) have also received some attention.
Clark [44] recently examined PAC-learning of NTS languages. Another languages
class that cross-cuts the Chomsky hierarchy is the class of very simple grammars
proposed by Yokomori which contains elements of 0-reversible, left Szilard of linear,
regular (Type-3), and NTS languages. [282].
We did not discover attempts to directly infer context-sensitive (Type-1) or
recursively enumerable (Type-0) languages.
3.12 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we related the problem domain of dynamic protocol reverse
engineering from network traces to the algorithm domain of grammatical inference.
We introduced the Chomsky Hierarchy as a framework for discussing computational
learnability. Next, we developed the symbolic model and mathematical notation that
defines the characteristics of the algorithm domain. Finally, we discussed several
existing algorithmic and heuristic approaches to grammatical inference.
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IV. Experimental Design
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the methodology we will use to evaluate
existing algorithms for effectiveness and efficiency in the dynamic protocol reverse
engineering discipline to establish empirical evidence for the applicability of gram-
matical inference. A hybrid application of state-of-practice format recognition and
grammatical inference is presented which could support the use of formal techniques
to identify vulnerabilities in the specification, implementation, and deployed configu-
ration of network protocols. We outline the approaches we implement in our experi-
mental design and detail the results of format recovery and control flow recovery. The
main emphasis is on techniques useful for protocol control flow (δ) recovery.
4.1 Application Level Network Traces into Automata
Once again, we must address the following four issues:
• Network trace collection.
• Application level protocol data flow recovery.
• Protocol format (Σ) recovery.
• Protocol transition function (δ) recovery.
None of the methods discussed in Chapter II or Chapter III provide an au-
tomated means of naming or uniquely identifying the operators that make up the
vocabulary of an arbitrary protocol. For this reason we propose mining the protocols
operator packet formats from existing open sources and algorithmically generating an
automata representation. The choice of development tools and supporting toolkits
are explained in Appendix B.
4.2 Protocol Selection
Specifications for open protocols, such as SMTP and POP3 are available in
online specification documents. Using open protocols may seem counter-intuitive
but it allows us to establish benchmarks for comparison. For closed or proprietary
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protocols, open source projects such as Bro, jNetStream, and Wireshark embody
the collective reverse engineering efforts of their contributors [19, 48, 140]. We select
POP3 and SMTP because they are textually represented, synchronous, and the session
boundaries are easily detected.
An additional reason we selected POP3 is that with only 10,960 TCP connection
attempts on port 110 it is relatively low volume in relation to SMTP traffic with
126,545 TCP connection attempts. This allowed us to evaluate the proof of concept
software on a lower volume, but similarly structured, protocol during incremental
development.
4.3 Algorithm Selection
The problem domain we are considering has the following characteristics: we
do not know if a sample is positive or negative, we do not have access to an ora-
cle and we do not know if the languages under consideration are characterizable by
regular languages or subclasses of regular languages. By constraining the scope of
the problem to textually represented single-channel protocols using TCP transport
on IPv4 networks (specifically SMTP and POP3) we know that the grammars for the
protocol languages are specified English language and in a context-free format (Aug-
mented BNF). We select k-RI, a characterizable method, and k-TSSI, an incremental
characterizeable method for our proof of concept implementation.
4.4 Experimental Architecture
Our experimental architecture is simplified by the use of an existing data set and
limiting the study to POP3 and SMTP. Because we are using an existing data set the
network trace collection is already determined. Also, both POP3 and SMTP encapsu-
late a complete session within a single transport level TCP connection. This reduces
our overall experimental architecture to protocol format (Σ) recovery and transition
function (δ) recovery. Figure 4.1 shows the two components that we implemented.
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Figure 4.1: Experimental Architecture Overview - protocol
format (Σ) recovery is implemented in the “Sample and Alpha-
bet Construction” process. The low level implementation, called
flowtool, uses hand coded POP3 and SMTP command and reply
parsers to generate an alphabet and sample strings. Transition
function (δ) recovery is implemented in the “Automata Infer-
ence” process. The low level implementation, called flowinfer,
executes the inference algorithm on the alphabet and sample
strings to generate an automata representation of the protocols
control flow.
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4.4.1 Network Trace Collection. Network trace collection for IPv4 protocols
is well covered by others. For our experimental architecture we are using existing
network traces so the collection architecture was pre-determined by the data set under
investigation. The data set used is the IDEVAL data set discussed in Appendix A.
The trace collection architecture used to build the IDEVAL data set is described
in [151].
4.4.2 Application Level Protocol Data Flow Recovery. Both of the selected
protocol’s session structures are encapsulated in single TCP connections. This makes
extraction of application level session data flows equivalent to extracting TCP con-
nections. Using the assumption that protocol ports are accurate for the IDEVAL
data set we de-multiplex the raw data to extract TCP traffic on port 25 (SMTP)
and port 110 (POP3). Finally, we merge the trace files for SMTP and POP3 traffic
into a cumulative data file. The pre-processing workflow is detailed in Appendix A
Section A.4.2.
4.4.3 Protocol Format Recovery. After the traces were extracted we used
a tool we developed called flowtool to create alphabet and sample strings from the
cumulative protocol traces and weekly protocol traces.
We implemented hand coded operator parsers for our proof of concept imple-
mentation. Since we are examining open protocols we were able to use the speci-
fication documents and heuristics from Wireshark and Bro to implement operator
oriented parsers. We processed the network trace files data with our flowtool to ex-
tract the alphabet and sample strings. A low level description of flowtool is provided
in Appendix B Section B.5.1.
4.4.4 Protocol Transition Function Recovery. The selected inference algo-
rithm is executed against the alphabet and sample strings created by flowtool. Be-
cause, we are using linear string models to represent samples of behavior we can select
from a range of existing GI algorithm implementations. We select simple DFA for
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our target automata representation. Future efforts that conduct performance analysis
must further consider the choice of target automata representation so it is appropriate
for performance analysis. A low level description of flowinfer processing is provided
in Appendix B Section B.5.2.
4.5 Limiting Factors
There are practical and theoretical limitations to what we can expect to achieve.
Limiting factors include our session detection technique, choice of oﬄine analysis, and
completeness of the IDEVAL data set.
4.5.1 Session Detection. Because we are attempting to recover the control
flow from only samples of protocol behavior we can not exactly replicate the state
transitions caused by the application stack of the distributed system. For example
the state transition of the SMTP sender from INITIAL to CONN ESTABLISHED
can be inferred by the TCP connection attempt but it is not part of the application
level protocol (see Figure 3.2). In fact, the initial state must be inferred by the state
of the underlying TCP connection and the final state determined by understanding
both the operators used internally and the state of the TCP connection.
To overcome this limitation flowtool adds TCP state operators to the alphabet
and sample strings. The operators added are: TCPopen, TCPclose, TCPreset, TCP-
timeout, and NIDSexit. Where TCPopen denotes the initiation of a TCP connection
and TCPclose the normal termination. The TCPreset operator denotes termination of
the TCP connection by a TCP RST while TCPtimeout denotes the TCP connection
has timed out. Finally, the NIDSexit operator denotes that libnids has encountered
the end of the trace file before the TCP connection terminated. This indicates that
data capture was terminated before the data flow was completely recorded in the
trace file. In other words, the trace file is incomplete.
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4.5.2 Online vs. Oﬄine Analysis. Online analysis for traffic and protocol
characterization was conducted by [195,200,223]. Because we are using existing data
sets we will concentrate on a posteriori oﬄine analysis instead of online analysis of
live execution traces. A summary of the capture file characteristics is provided in
Appendix A. The weekly file characteristics are in Section A.4.2. The characteristics
of the individual daily network capture are described in Section A.4.1.
4.5.3 Target Automata Representation. There are several representations
that we can consider for target automata representation. Two that already pro-
vide a basis for analytical backends are CFSM and MSC as previously discussed
in Section 2.8.2.2 and Section 2.8.2.1. Both the CFSM and MSC representations
have characteristics which must be considered before choosing one over the other.
CFSM have verification techniques including reachability and reverse reachability
analysis [196]. Deadlock detection techniques are also available [96]. MSC can also be
verified through process of realizability but only for bounded sizes [5]. Verifying an
unbounded MSC using LTL model checking is in general undecidable [5]. While MSC
might be useful for simple protocol automata the constraints on verifiability cause us
to favor CFSM representations for future efforts.
Although both CFSM and MSC models provide more powerful representation
we select DFA for simplicities sake in our proof of concept implementation.
4.5.4 Incomplete Data. Training data density will impact analysis [41]. We
can expect only partial correctness (approximate) inference results if the input does
not contain a representative sample of the protocol commands and replies. If the
data set does not contain a representative sample of the protocol under investigation
(i.e. the data is sparse or noisy) then the accuracy of the inference will be low.
Unfortunately, the SMTP and POP3 traffic in the IDEVAL data set does not fully
cover the allowed operators (Σ) in their respective specifications.
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Table 4.1: POP3 Command Alphabet Weekly Overview - The IDEVAL data set
does not exercise all operators allowed by the POP3 specification.
POP3 Command Alphabet Weekly Overview
Command Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Total
STAT 255 236 395 303 321 1,510
DELE 402 400 752 409 455 2,418
USER 255 236 395 303 323 1,513
UIDL 0 0 0 0 0 0
QUIT 255 237 395 303 323 1,513
TOP 0 0 0 0 0 0
RETR 402 400 752 409 455 2,418
RSET 0 0 0 0 0 0
APOP 0 0 0 0 0 0
LIST 0 0 0 0 0 0
PASS 255 236 395 303 321 1,510
NOOP 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.5.4.1 POP3 Alphabet (Σ) Overview. For POP3 we discovered no
occurrences of the following operators in the cumulative data: APOP, LIST, NOOP,
RSET, TOP, UIDL. Table 4.1 summarizes the command/operator types observed in
the IDEVAL data set. The POP3 specification, unlike SMTP, requires all command
verbs be encoded in upper case [112]. The POP3 specification only describes two
reply codes +OK and -ERR of which we observed 20,559 +OK and 60 -ERR replies.
We did not parse the replies for information beyond the reply code.
4.5.4.2 SMTP Alphabet (Σ) Overview. For SMTP we discovered no
occurrences of the following operators in the cumulative data: EXPN, NOOP, SEND,
SOML, SAML, VRFY. The cumulative counts for discovered SMTP operators are
shown in Table 4.2. It must be noted that although the SMTP has a rigid syntax
the specification allows for all commands and replies to be in upper case, mixed case,
or lower case [113, Section 2.4]. As shown in Table 4.2 we observed occurrences of
lower case commands used by the mailbomb attack but no occurrences of mixed case
commands. The SMTP Reply alphabet occurrences are summarized in Table 4.4.
72
Table 4.2: SMTP Cumulative Command Alphabet - The IDEVAL data set does
not exercise all operators allowed by the SMTP specification.
SMTP Cumulative Command Alphabet
Command Count Note
MAIL 118,029 Initiate a mail transaction
mail 1,672 Lower case MAIL
RSET 22 Abort current mail transaction.
DATA 117,899 Treat all lines as message body until data
is terminated by <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>
QUIT 114,986 Server must send an OK reply and close
the transmission channel
EHLO 112,131 Initiate session (extended format)
HELO 112,956 Initiate session
RCPT 186,548 Identifies an individual recipient; multiple
recipients are specified by multiple occur-
rences
rcpt 1,670 lower case RCPT
HELP 3 Server sends helpful information to the
client
4.5.5 Noisy Data. Our na¨ıve assumption that the port used by TCP connec-
tion level traffic would indicate the type of encapsulated application level data proved
wrong. Because the IDEVAL data set is designed for intrusion detection system per-
formance evaluation it contains intentionally generated attack traffic. We consider
the intentional attack traffic to be noise for our purposes. The specific types of noise
that impact the alphabet and sample string creation are generated by mailbomb, tcp-
reset, and SYN flood attacks. To overcome noise generated by intentional misuse we
developed extrinsic filtering heuristics discussed in Section 4.6. The reader is referred
to [286] for detailed descriptions of the attacks. Figure 4.2 shows the command and
reply flow for an attack.
Accurate recognition of the protocol in the trace is essential to the accuracy of
the k-RI and k-TSSI inference. Both algorithms are sensitive to noise if we treat all
input samples as positive data. Because we are able to recognize the control flow of
non-compliant traffic for SMTP and POP3 we can automatically label each sample
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Table 4.3: SMTP Command Alphabet Weekly Overview - The IDEVAL data set
does not exercise all operators allowed by the SMTP specification. Note that the
Total column does not sum the Week columns due to incomplete TCP connection
traces in the weekly pcap files.
SMTP Command Alphabet Weekly Overview
Command Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Total
HELO 18,602 20,044 30,957 21,318 22,896 112,956
. 19,391 20,765 32,152 22,365 23,961 117,777
HELP 0 0 0 2 1 3
SAML 0 0 0 0 0 0
MAIL 19,424 20,858 32,167 22,391 24,050 118,029
mail 0 753 0 905 0 1,672
SOML 0 0 0 0 0 0
EHLO 18,244 19,701 30,420 21,263 22,570 112,131
QUIT 18,666 20,155 31,206 21774 23,124 114,900
EXPN 0 0 0 0 0 0
RSET 0 6 0 15 1 22
VRFY 0 0 0 0 0 0
SEND 0 0 0 0 0 0
RCPT 27,812 31,688 50,543 36,882 40,484 186,548
rcpt 0 753 0 905 0 1,670
DATA 19,424 20,801 32,167 22,383 23,985 117,899
NOOP 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 4.4: SMTP Reply Alphabet Summary.
SMTP Reply Alphabet Summary
Reply Count Note
220 126,266 Indicates beginning of session
250 565,331 Indicates last operation completed success-
fully
221 104,798 Service closing transmission channel
354 122,396 Start mail input; end with
<CR><LF>.<CR><LF>
421 416 Service not available, closing transmission
channel
451 209 Requested action aborted: local error in
processing
500 107,073 Syntax error, command unrecognized
503 3 Bad sequence of commands
551 346 User not local; please try forward-path
552 2 Requested mail action aborted: exceeded
storage allocation
Table 4.5: SMTP Reply Alphabet Weekly Overview.
SMTP Reply Alphabet Weekly Overview
Reply Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Total
551 0 58 0 63 225 346
503 0 0 0 2 1 3
552 0 0 0 1 1 2
421 0 0 0 215 201 416
220 19,424 22,865 32,170 25,096 27,573 126,266
221 15,931 19,828 27,345 21,607 20,087 104,798
354 19,424 22,800 32,167 24,881 23,985 122,396
451 0 0 0 106 103 209
500 17,422 18,887 29,208 20,207 21,416 107,073
250 88,118 101,824 149,971 113,555 114,504 565,331
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Figure 4.2: Wireshark Following Bad SMTP Session - the
session transcript contains asynchronous commands and replies
caused by a buffer overflow injection attack.
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as positive or negative. This allows us to ignore the negative samples during control
flow inference.
4.5.6 Connection Level Protocol Stack. The libnids library which we use to
handle TCP connection level packet reassembly and defragmentation is an additional
limiting factor. The library interprets TCP connection communication using a mod-
ified TCP/IP protocol stack from the Linux version 2.0.x kernel [275]. This means
that the application level data presented to our flowtool will be ordered in the same
manner. This problem is partially exposed by non-SMTP traffic on the SMTP port
during Weeks 4 and Weeks 5 of the IDEVAL data set.
4.6 Extrinsic Heuristics for Noise Filtering
We concentrated first on direct na¨ıve implementation of our format extraction
algorithms followed by incremental refinement. Initial pre-processing runs contained
noise caused by intentional misuse of the protocols under consideration. We used the
output of the early runs to develop the filtering mechanism that automatically labeled
noise sample strings as negative samples. The following criteria are used to label a
sample as negative (noise):
Early Termination If the TCP connection terminates without application level pro-
tocol session termination the sample is marked negative. This means any sample
ending with TCPreset, TCPtimeout, or NIDSexit is marked negative.
No Application Data An empty TCP connection without application level traffic,
that is, a TCPopen followed immediately by TCPclose.
Asynchronous Command/Reply If the composite sample indicates asynchronous
communication the sample is marked negative. Asynchronous communication
is detected when a command follows a command, a reply follows a reply, or the
sample contains only replies or commands.
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Table 4.6: Buffer overflow attacks on SMTP server at 172.16.114.50 - The victim
server is described as an internal host named marx.eyrie.af.mil running Redhat 4.2
kernel 2.0.27 [286]. Details for the attacking hosts, 152.204.232 and 202.49.244.10,
are not provided with the IDEVAL data set.
Type Source IP:port Start End Sample
6 152.204.232.193:1941 923693227.228408 923693238.320118 TCPopen 220 250 250 250 503 HELP 500 221
TCPclose
32 202.49.244.10:1027 922715292.597701 922715294.666466 TCPopen 220 250 250 503 HELP 500 221
TCPclose
32 202.49.244.10.1027 922715290.284924 922715292.352719 TCPopen 220 250 250 503 HELP 500 221
TCPclose
Early termination was observed in 6,754 of 126,545 samples for SMTP traffic
and 8,192 of 10,960 samples in POP3 traffic. As shown in Table A.5 4,432 of the 6,754
SMTP early terminations were observed during week 5 of the IDEVAL data set. A
significant portion, 8,090, of the 8,192 POP3 early terminations are caused by TCP
resets during week 5 (See Table A.10 in Appendix A).
An asynchronous sample is generated by the mailbomb attack (sample Type-41
in Table A.9): TCPopen 220 mail 250 250 354 250 221 TCPclose. The mailbomb
SMTP communications are recognized as asynchronous because it terminates com-
mands with <CR> instead of a standards compliant <CR><LF>. The SMTP servers are
able to parse the non-compliant communication and pass back compliant replies that
are detected by flowtool.
Another example of asynchronous behavior is generate by a buffer overflow
attack, shown in Figure 4.2. Wireshark shows more detail than our flowtool because it
interprets <CR> terminated commands. The protocol parsers in flowtool only recognize
specification compliant <CR><LF> terminated commands. The attack generates one
sample of Type-6 and two samples of Type-32 during Week 4. The three samples are
summarized in Table 4.6.
While the SMTP specification does not require synchronous operation it does re-
quire synchronous communication. Reply codes indicate that processing is underway
and every command must generate exactly one reply [113, Section 4.2]. Asynchronous
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operation is specifically permitted during session termination where the server can
send a 421 reply asynchronously after receiving a QUIT [113, Section 3.9].
Like SMTP, the POP3 specification requires synchronous communication. The
POP3 specification requires an -ERR response to any unrecognized or invalid com-
mand and allows the server to automatically terminate a session after 10 minutes of
inactivity [112].
4.7 Inference Accuracy
The hypothesis automata might over-restrict or over-generalize the actual target
automaton of the system under consideration. If the hypothesis automata is over-
restrictive it will not contain states and transitions that are necessary to accurately
represent the target automaton. If the hypothesis automata over-generalizes it will
contain states and transitions that are not necessary to minimally represent the target
automaton. To accurately quantify the over-restrictiveness or over-generalization of
the inference algorithm we must know a priori the actual automaton of the protocol
under consideration. This is without regard to the performance characteristics of the
target automaton and language class membership.
One option is to synthesize an approximate target automaton directly from the
protocol specification. Unfortunately, the specifications for the specific protocols we
are considering, SMTP and POP3, are provided in Request For Comment (RFC)
documents as English language descriptions of the control flow and Augmented BNF
descriptions of the operator formats. This is problematic because the English language
descriptions of control flow are open to interpretation. Additionally, in general it is
undecidable if a context-free grammar is regular [180, Section 4]. While a regular
language (Type-3) is represetable as a context-free language (Type-2) the inverse does
not hold. Furthermore, transforming a context-free grammar that generates a regular
language into a FSA accepting the same language is, in general, unsolvable [180,
Section 4].
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Figure 4.3: SMTP Session Initiation - SMTP session initiation
starts with the TCP connection from the client to the server.
The server replies with 220 then the client attempts a EHLO
and if it fails HELO.
Because the protocols we are considering are described in English language
(control portion) and context-free Augmented BNF (data portion) we manually gen-
erate a specification “compliant” DFA representation of the subset of the specification
commands exercised by the IDEVAL data set for comparison purposes. The choice of
compliance instead of conformance is intentional. The widely accepted Internet proto-
cols described in RFC documents, unlike ISO OSI protocols, do not have a standards
body that provides test suites or other conformance measurement methodologies. We
limit our manually generated automata to the happy path of each protocol. That
is, we do not include all possible error conditions from each state only the results of
successful commands.
While the complete session for both protocols is encapsulated in a single TCP
connection they do provide for session initiation, transaction, and session termination
stages. The separate stages for SMTP are shown in Figure 4.3, Figure 4.4 and Fig-
ure 4.5. Our target automaton for SMTP has 19 states, 21 edges, 1 initial state, and
1 final state. The separate stages for POP3 are shown in Figure 4.6, Figure 4.7 and
Figure 4.8. Our target automaton for POP3 has 15 states, 15 edges, 1 initial state,
and 1 final state.
4.7.1 Inferred POP3 Control Flow. Figures for the automaton generated
for POP3 by k-RI and k-TSSI inference for k values of 1, 2 and 3 are shown in
Appendix C.
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Figure 4.4: SMTP Session Transaction - A transaction stage
is started when the client sends a MAIL command followed by
one or more RCPT and then a DATA command terminated with
a period on a line by itself.
Figure 4.5: SMTP Session Termination - Session termination
is initiated when the client sends a QUIT command to which the
server replies with a 250 or 221 then finally the TCP connection
should be closed.
Figure 4.6: POP3 Session Initiation - POP3 session initiation
starts with the TCP connection from the client to the server.
The server replies with +OK then the client attempts authenti-
cation with USER then PASS commands.
Figure 4.7: POP3 Session Transaction - After authentication
the transaction stage starts which allows LIST, RECV followed
by DELT, and STAT commands.
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Figure 4.8: POP3 Session Termination - The session ends
when the client sends a QUIT command and the server replies
with +OK and finally the TCP connection is closed.
Table 4.7: k-RI POP3 Composite Automaton Filtered.
k-RI POP3 Composite Automaton Filtered
k States Edges Initial Terminal
Target 15 15 1 1
PTA 163 162 1 18
1 15 15 1 1
2 16 17 1 1
3 18 19 1 1
4 20 21 1 1
5 22 22 1 2
6 23 24 1 2
7 25 26 1 2
8 27 28 1 2
9 29 29 1 3
10 30 31 1 3
The k-RI, with k = 1, inference produced an automaton that exactly matches
the target automaton for the subset of the protocol exercised in the IDEVAL data
set for both POP3. The k-RI inference over-generalized the target automaton at k
values of 2, 3, 4, and 5. The k-TSSI inference over-restricted the inference at k = 1,
and was equivalent to the k-RI inference for k values of 2, 3, 4, and 5. The number of
states and edges for POP3 k-RI inference is shown in Table 4.7 and k-TSSI inference
in Table 4.8.
4.7.2 Inferred SMTP Control Flow. Ambiguities in the specification are
exhibited in the inferred control flow. The SMTP RFC allows two different replies
to a QUIT command. In [113, Section 4.1.1.10] the specification states: “This com-
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Table 4.8: k-TSSI POP3 Composite Automaton Filtered.
k-TSSI POP3 Composite Automaton Filtered
k States Edges Initial Terminal
Target 15 15 1 1
1 10 15 1 1
2 16 17 1 1
3 18 19 1 1
4 20 21 1 1
5 22 22 1 2
6 23 24 1 2
7 25 26 1 2
8 27 28 1 2
9 29 29 1 3
10 30 31 1 3
Table 4.9: k-RI POP3 Composite Automaton Unfiltered.
k-RI POP3 Composite Automaton Unfiltered
k States Edges Initial Terminal
Target 15 15 1 1
PTA 205 204 1 30
1 47 55 1 4
2 56 59 1 11
3 60 61 1 13
4 62 63 1 13
5 64 64 1 14
6 65 66 1 14
7 67 68 1 14
8 69 70 1 14
9 71 71 1 15
10 72 73 1 15
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Table 4.10: k-TSSI POP3 Composite Automaton Unfiltered.
k-TSSI POP3 Composite Automaton Unfiltered
k States Edges Initial Terminal
Target 15 15 1 1
1 14 31 1 4
2 32 38 1 11
3 39 41 1 13
4 42 44 1 13
5 45 46 1 14
6 47 49 1 14
7 50 52 1 14
8 53 55 1 14
9 56 57 1 15
10 58 60 1 15
mand specifies that the receiver MUST send an OK reply, and then close the trans-
mission channel“. In [113, Section 4.2.2] 221 is defined as: 221 <domain> Service
closing transmission channel. A three digit reply starting with 2 indicates pos-
itive complete, the second digit 2 indicates a transmission channel and 5 indicates
status of the receiver mail system, and the third digit is used to indicate finer grain
answers [113, Section 4.2.1]. The lack of clarity in the specification is reflected in the
data set. The server named hume with IP number 172.16.112.100 replies to QUIT
commands with 250 while others reply with 221.
The number of states and edges for SMTP k-RI inference is shown in Table 4.11
and k-TSSI inference in Table 4.12.
4.8 Sensitivity to Noise
The selected inference algorithms are directly sensitive to noise. Any sample
string created by our format recognition that is not a member of the protocol under
consideration will cause over-generalization of the target automaton.
One SMTP composite sample type is of particular interest because of its impact
result of k-RI inference. Type-41, with 3 occurrences contains a series of valid com-
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Table 4.11: k-RI SMTP Composite Automaton Filtered.
k-RI SMTP Composite Automaton Filtered
k States Edges Initial Terminal
Target 19 21 1 1
PTA 454 453 1 36
1 60 68 1 1
2 69 76 1 2
3 77 84 1 3
4 85 92 1 4
5 93 101 1 5
6 102 111 1 6
7 112 123 1 6
8 124 136 1 7
9 137 150 1 8
10 151 165 1 9
Table 4.12: k-TSSI SMTP Composite Automaton Filtered.
k-TSSI SMTP Composite Automaton Filtered
k States Edges Initial Terminal
Target 19 21 1 1
1 11 18 1 1
2 19 26 1 2
3 27 36 1 4
4 37 49 1 5
5 50 65 1 7
6 66 82 1 9
7 83 97 1 13
8 98 111 1 16
9 112 124 1 19
10 125 134 1 22
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Table 4.13: k-RI SMTP Composite Automaton Unfiltered.
k-RI SMTP Composite Automaton Unfiltered
k States Edges Initial Terminal
Target 19 21 1 1
PTA 587 586 1 99
1 85 131 1 4
2 133 155 1 30
3 157 172 1 40
4 175 187 1 45
5 188 198 1 49
6 199 210 1 51
7 211 226 1 51
8 227 244 1 55
9 245 261 1 58
10 262 286 1 60
Table 4.14: k-TSSI SMTP Composite Automaton Unfiltered.
k-TSSI SMTP Composite Automaton Unfiltered
k States Edges Initial Terminal
Target 19 21 1 1
1 28 90 1 4
2 91 115 1 30
3 116 132 1 40
4 133 146 1 45
5 147 158 1 49
6 159 170 1 51
7 171 186 1 51
8 187 204 1 55
9 205 221 1 58
10 222 247 1 60
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Table 4.15: k-RI SMTP Composite Automaton Type-41 removed - k-RI inference
results improve when 3 occurrences of sample Type-41 are removed.
k-RI SMTP Composite Automaton Type-41 removed
k States Edges Initial Terminal
Target 19 21 1 1
1 19 26 1 1
2 27 33 1 2
3 34 40 1 3
4 41 47 1 4
5 48 55 1 5
6 56 64 1 6
7 65 75 1 6
8 76 87 1 7
9 88 100 1 8
10 101 114 1 9
mand/reply pairs that are reset by the RSET command (See Appendix A Table A.9).
The k-RI algorithm is unable to reduce the sequence resulting in over-generalization.
If we remove the 3 samples marking them as negative samples k-RI inference results
improve (See Table 4.15 and Table 4.11. On the other hand, k-TSSI inference is not
impacted by Type-41 samples.
4.9 Algorithm Runtimes
We executed the k-RI and k-TSSI algorithms agains the composite samples
to develop an approximate understanding of the runtime. The runtimes presented
are specific to the IDEVAL data set and the execution environment used for analysis.
They should NOT be interpreted as a general performance indicator. Both algorithms
were executed 250 times against the composite samples for k values 1 to 5. The
executables were compiled with GCC version 3.3.6 with optimizations enabled (-O3).
The environment used was openSUSE version 10.3 running on a Intel Core 2 Duo
T2500 operating at 2.0 GHz based computer. The runtimes reported are the average
of 250 executions.
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Table 4.16: POP3 Composite Runtimes - runtimes are in seconds.
POP3 Composite Runtimes
k k-RI k-TSSI
1 0.43084 0.0258
2 0.4074 0.01652
3 0.38852 0.01792
4 0.1558 0.01828
5 0.49132 0.0196
Table 4.17: SMTP Composite Runtimes - runtimes are in seconds.
SMTP Composite Runtimes
k k-RI k-TSSI
1 2.73996 0.02196
2 3.02336 0.019
3 4.20492 0.0204
4 4.52704 0.02156
5 4.7618 0.0226
4.10 Chapter Summary
We presented a hybrid application of state-of-practice format recognition and
grammatical inference of protocol control flow which could support the use of for-
mal techniques to identify vulnerabilities in the specification, implementation, and
deployed configuration of network protocols. We outlined our experimental design
and detailed the results of format recovery and control flow recovery for POP3 and
SMTP protocol traffic from the IDEVAL 1999 data set.
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V. Analysis and Results
Dynamic protocol reverse engineering is a challenging problem that is unlikely to yield
significant progress without research across a broad multi-disciplinary range of topics.
Here we present experimental results of our proof of concept implementation and our
conclusions. Finally we propose areas for future research.
5.1 Conclusions
While we have demonstrated the applicability of two grammatical inference al-
gorithms for two specific protocols we have not established generality of the approach.
5.1.1 Experimental Results. The k-RI algorithm provided accurate inference
of POP3 control flow with k = 1 on filtered data. The k-RI algorithm approximated
our target automaton for SMTP with k = 1 when we removed samples that contained
operators not included in our target automaton. k-TSSI over-restricted POP3 traffic
with k = 1 and overgeneralized for other values of k. k-TSSI also over-restricted
SMTP traffic for k = 1 and overgeneralized for other values of k.
5.1.2 Investigative Questions Answered. The focus of this research was the
evaluation of existing Grammatical Inference algorithms for the dynamic protocol
reverse engineering domain. We examined the following questions with the following
results:
[IQ1] What information is necessary to reverse engineer the control portion of
application layer protocols from data flows?
A network trace collection architecture must be constructed that is able to
accurately record traces of the protocol traffic with out loosing samples. Next, we
must have a means to reconstruct the application session. Finally, we must have
access to the format of protocol operators or be able to derive the operator format.
[IQ2] Given the proven [7,95] difficulty of inferring finite automata from positive
samples only, are there GI approaches that are appropriate for reverse engineering
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automata representations of the control portion of application layer protocols from
data flows?
For the specific protocols we examined the answer is yes within limits of data
completeness. Both k-RI and k-TSSI inference were able to infer control flow that
fit the target automata for POP3 and closely approximated the target automata for
SMTP data observed in the IDEVAL data set. Unfortunately, the IDEVAL data
set does not completely exercise either protocol resulting in incomplete automata.
Finally, we have not established the generality of the approach and must leave this
as an open question.
5.2 Future Work
This thesis presented a grammatical inference approach to reverse engineering
models of protocol control flow from network traces. This is an initial step in gener-
ating tactical cyber weapons that target computer network systems. Future research
could evaluate the following areas:
1. Model recovery of other classes of protocols such as: asynchronous, binary rep-
resented, multi-connection and multi-channel protocols from network traces.
2. Model recovery of higher order automata such as context-free grammars, context-
sensitive grammars.
3. Model recovery from other families of protocols. While we concentrated on
a subset of application level protocols on IPv4 networks similar experimental
analysis could be conducted against other classes of protocols, such as SCADA
or SS7, for vulnerability assessment and generation of targeted effects.
4. Online, live, and incremental model recovery. The experimental structure evalu-
ated in this thesis requires the full (non-incremental) construction of the sample
space. The k-RI and k-TSSI algorithms evaluated could support incremental
modifications.
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5. Formal analysis of automatically generated models 1. Ammons presents formal
analysis of specifications automatically generated from observations of instru-
mented applications [6]. Dallmeier examines the discovery of normal program
behavior [59]. Bishop [30] studied automated specification discovery at the
packet level of granularity. It could be beneficial to examine automatically cre-
ated protocol specifications for implementation issues that allow deliberately
crafted packets that lead a protocol parser to conditions that are unexpected.
6. Consoldiation of the well known grammatical inference algorithms into an open
source analysis framework like Weka [274] or Rapidminer [171], or modeling
framework like Ptolemy [144] might benefit the machine learning community.
The Mical [213] and Learnlib [211] projects present frameworks which implement
several GI algorithms. Algorithms could be gleaned from other research efforts
(e.g. [46, 169]).
7. Examine other automated or semi-automated approaches to discovering protocol
defects such as RCE or randomized boundary testing 2.
8. Examine cryptographic protocol verification methodologies for formalisms that
can be adopted to protocol reverse engineering in general. Dongxi [66], for exam-
ple, proposes an automatic attack construction algorithm to discover potential
attacks on cryptographic security protocols.
9. Further examine meta-heuristic techniques such as tabu search or randomized
techniques like genetic algorithms for their applicability to inference of protocol
control flow.
10. Construction of a publicly releaseable research data set containing contempo-
rary network traffic. Limitations of the IDEVAL data set used in this research
are discussed in Appendix A. It would be beneficial to the network research com-
1 [67, 273] provide overviews of formal analysis.
2Commonly referred to as fuzzing [249, Chapter 14] and [175,188].
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munity as a whole to develop a data set which addresses the concerns presented
by [166].
11. Formalize results of inference mechanisms. While we presented limited empirical
evidence that grammatical inference algorithms could be applied to the problem
domain under consideration we did not provide formal proof of the performance
characteristics.
12. Examine other language models besides linear systems built from strings. [224]
presents extensions of formal languages for multi-dimensional objects such as
trees and graphs or Clark’s planar languages [45,46].
5.3 Summary
Ultimately, the grammatical inference approach presented only provides infor-
mation that can assist an informed human analyst in protocol reverse engineering. The
analyst will still have to apply common heuristics (e.g. identifying signpost values,
block structure inference, or windowed entropy). We have provided limited empir-
ical evidence that our grammatical inference approach to dynamic protocol reverse
engineering is applicable to the protocol reverse engineering problem domain. This
approach to control flow recovery should be further developed to support automated
analysis of inferred control flow for performance characteristics.
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Appendix A. Data
This appendix describes the data set used in this thesis and provides samples of the
application level protocol traces under consideration.
A.1 Natural Data Sets
The Internet Traffic Archive (ITA) is a moderated repository to support widespread
access to traces of Internet network traffic, sponsored by ACM SIGCOMM [139]. A
data set was previously offered by the Passive Measurement and Anallysis (PMA)
project of NLANR and now by CADIA provides header traces from OC3 through
OC48 speeds [167]. Unfortunately, the ITA and NLANR/PAM data sets were to nar-
rowly focused for our research efforts and did not contain application level protocol
traces.
A.2 Artificial Data Sets
While the ITA and NLANR/PAM data sets draw from real world traffic we
also considered the use of artificial data sets. Various authors have proposed or
constructed data sets of network traces appropriate for their area of studies [58,215].
The LARIAT system [222] was considered for generation of application level protocol
traces. Regrettably, we were not able to gain access to a working LARIAT system
early enough to generate appropriate data sets.
A.3 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation data set
The DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation data set is available from the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Lincoln Laboratory. The data set was pro-
duced by the Information Systems Technology (IST) Group of MIT Lincoln Labo-
ratory under Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force
Research Laboratory (AFRL) sponsorship [286]. The data set provides examples of
attacks and background traffic. More importantly for this research it provides sim-
ulation of user generated traffic of ASCII text represented single-channel POP3 and
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SMTP protocol traffic. POP3 traffic involved internal users accessing external mail
servers [151]. SMTP traffic was comprised of individual, group and global email mes-
sages to and from all simulated users [151]. Like Mahoney we will refer to the data
set as IDEVAL [155]. IDEVAL is both publicly available and widely used in research
efforts.
A.3.1 IDEVAL Data Quality. While the IDEVAL is widely used for evalu-
ation of intrusion detection algorithms and systems there has been some concern ex-
pressed about how accurately the data set represents more contemporary TCP/IP net-
work activity [155]. In his assessment McHugh even questions the collection method-
ology, attack taxonomy and low traffic rates (among other characteristics) [166]. Ma-
honey and Chan analyzed the data set for simulation artifacts concluding that the
data set lacked real-world ranges in the packet parameters (i.e. TTL, TCP flags, TCP
windows size) [155]. Furthermore the data set lacks real-world traffic crud caused by
incorrect implementations of the TCP/IP protocols [119,155].
A.3.2 IDEVAL Data Relevance. The IDEVAL network configuration does
not reflect contemporary hardware, software, or operating systems. Operating sys-
tems used include MacOS, Redhat 5.0 kernel 2.0.32, Redhat 5.2 kernel 2.0.36, Solaris
2.5.1, Solaris 2.6, SunOS 4.1.4, Windows 3.1, Windows 95, and Windows NT 4.0 build
1381 Service Pack 1 [286]. None of these operating systems are currently authorized
for use in DOD networks. Dialects of network protocols are manifested in implemen-
tation specific interpretations and extensions of protocol specifications. Given, the
dated OS protocol stacks used to generate traffic the IDEVAL data set might not
precisely reflect current network traffic. Additionally, the topology of the network,
shown in Figure A.1, is not representative of contemporary networks.
A.4 Data Files
The characteristics of the data files used are summarized in A.1 and A.2. The
characteristics merged data are summarized in Table A.3 and Table A.4. The infor-
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Figure A.1: IDEVAL1999 Network Topology [286].
mation was generated using the capinfos utility that accompanies Wireshark. The
capinfo utility reported errors for the following files:
wk5.day2.outside.pcap An error occurred after reading 2,558,481 packets. Less
data was read than expected.
wk5.day3.outside.pcap An error occurred after reading 1,385,130 packets. Less
data was read than expected.
wk5.day4.outside.pcap An error occurred after reading 2,308,273 packets. Less
data was read than expected.
wk5.day5.outside.pcap An error occurred after reading 2,651,589 packets. Less
data was read than expected.
Additionally, the file wk2.day4.inside.pcap was not included in the data set we
used.
A.4.1 Complete Data File set.
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Table A.1: IDEVAL Data Files Size - Size columns are measured in bytes. The Data Rate
is measured in bytes/second.
IDEVAL Data Files Size
Name Packets File Size Data Size Data Rate (bytes/s) Avg Size
Week 1
wk1.day1.inside.pcap 1,492,331 341,027,537 317,150,217 4003.90 212.52
wk1.day1.outside.pcap 1,362,869 323,832,360 302,026,432 3813.47 221.61
wk1.day2.inside.pcap 1,237,119 341,401,548 321,607,620 4060.92 259.96
wk1.day2.ouside.pcap 1,157,328 325,395,277 306,878,005 3874.78 265.16
wk1.day3.inside.pcap 1,726,319 385,142,370 357,521,242 4514.33 207.10
wk1.day3.outside.pcap 1,616,713 368,776,477 342,909,045 4329.76 212.10
wk1.day4.inside.pcap 1,947,815 552,903,806 521,738,742 6588.39 267.86
wk1.day4.outside.pcap 1,807,060 517,042,040 488,129,056 6163.26 270.12
wk1.day5.inside.pcap 1,483,419 308,604,831 284,870,103 3596.96 192.04
wk1.day5.outside.pcap 1,349,635 284,774,805 263,180,621 3323.00 195.00
Week 2
wk2.day1.inside.pcap 1,753,377 401,046,958 372,992,902 4709.84 212.73
wk2.day1.outside.pcap 1,337,777 329,322,084 307,917,628 3885.50 230.17
wk2.day2.inside.pcap 1,585,120 400,104,805 374,742,861 5462.75 236.41
wk2.day2.outside.pcap 1,454,035 375,798,588 352,534,004 5154.17 242.45
wk2.day3.inside.pcap 1,011,149 169,156,383 152,977,975 1931.66 151.29
wk2.day3.outside.pcap 888,139 145,698,730 131,488,482 1660.24 148.05
wk2.day4.outside.pcap 1,412,645 330,867,682 308,285,665 3892.62 218.23
wk2.day5.inside.pcap 1,362,422 291,511,690 269,712,914 3405.61 197.97
wk2.day5.outside.pcap 1,252,412 273,295,370 253,256,754 3197.75 202.22
Week 3
wk3.day1.inside.extra.pcap 1,679,048 233,849,898 206,985,106 2709.36 123.28
wk3.day1.inside.pcap 2,106,744 468,024,334 434,316,406 5484.02 206.16
wk3.day1.outside.extra.pcap 1,191,358 150,014,497 130,952,745 1712.91 109.92
wk3.day1.outside.pcap 1,542,614 371,123,625 346,441,777 4374.34 224.58
wk3.day2.inside.extra.pcap 2,152,964 460,059,143 425,611,695 5387.50 197.69
wk3.day2.inside.pcap 1,831,648 414,885,615 385,579,223 4868.70 210.51
wk3.day2.outside.extra.pcap 1,822,764 403,648,042 374,483,794 4728.46 205.45
wk3.day2.outside.pcap 1,374,431 334,280,722 312,289,802 3943.11 227.21
wk3.day3.inside.pcap 1,849,753 558,991,635 529,395,563 6684.58 286.20
wk3.day3.ouside.pcap 1,760,859 540,109,859 511,936,091 6464.05 290.73
wk3.day3.outside.extra.pcap 2,453,966 766,843,295 727,579,815 9186.76 296.49
wk3.day4.inside.pcap 1,559,156 260,180,866 235,234,346 3235.69 150.87
wk3.day4.outside.pcap 1,096,660 183,158,763 165,612,179 2277.96 151.02
wk3.day5.inside.pcap 1,635,425 513,197,145 487,030,321 7939.98 297.80
Week 4
wk4.day1.inside.pcap 1,647,573 285,359,948 258,998,756 3270.39 157.20
wk4.day1.outside.pcap 1,279,543 216,724,852 196,252,140 2478.00 153.38
wk4.day2.outside.pcap 1,309,242 301,682,860 280,734,964 3544.68 214.43
wk4.day3.inside.pcap 1,766,074 399,300,104 371,042,896 4685.55 210.09
wk4.day3.outside.pcap 1,315,032 319,141,540 298,101,004 3764.00 226.69
wk4.day4.inside.pcap 2,356,503 519,183,790 481,479,718 6080.20 204.32
wk4.day4.outside.pcap 1,635,267 399,619,424 373,455,128 4715.46 228.38
wk4.day5.inside.pcap 1,945,538 368,018,512 336,889,880 4254.06 173.16
wk4.day5.outside.pcap 1,318,345 262,141,472 241,047,928 3043.60 182.84
Week 5
wk5.day1.inside.pcap 2,291,319 477,303,765 440,642,637 5564.14 192.31
wk5.day1.outside.pcap 1,376,598 344,257,810 322,232,218 4068.72 234.08
wk5.day2.inside.pcap 3,404,824 524,283,553 469,806,345 5932.00 137.98
wk5.day3.inside.pcap 2,087,942 491,350,468 457,943,372 5782.72 219.33
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Name Packets File Size (bytes) Data Size (bytes) Data Rate (bytes/s) Avg Size
wk5.day4.inside.pcap 3,201,381 826,909,800 775,687,680 9794.98 242.30
wk5.day5.inside.pcap 3,393,918 1,093,706,789 1,039,404,077 13124.91 306.25
Table A.2: IDEVAL Data Files Time - Duration is in seconds. Start and End are specified
in Unix epoch time format. That is, they are specified in seconds since 00:00:00 UTC on
January 1, 1970.
IDEVAL Data Files Time
Name Duration Start Time Start End Time End
Week 1
wk1.day1.inside.pcap 79210.265570 Mon Mar 1 08:00:05 1999 920293205 Tue Mar 2 06:00:16 1999 920372416
wk1.day1.outside.pcap 79199.855007 Mon Mar 1 08:00:02 1999 920293202 Tue Mar 2 06:00:02 1999 920372402
wk1.day2.inside.pcap 79195.839551 Tue Mar 2 08:00:01 1999 920379601 Wed Mar 3 05:59:57 1999 920458797
wk1.day2.ouside.pcap 79198.903380 Tue Mar 2 08:00:02 1999 920379602 Wed Mar 3 06:00:01 1999 920458801
wk1.day3.inside.pcap 79196.915752 Wed Mar 3 08:00:01 1999 920466001 Thu Mar 4 05:59:58 1999 920545198
wk1.day3.outside.pcap 79198.122434 Wed Mar 3 08:00:03 1999 920466003 Thu Mar 4 06:00:01 1999 920545201
wk1.day4.inside.pcap 79190.607508 Thu Mar 4 08:00:01 1999 920552401 Fri Mar 5 05:59:52 1999 920631592
wk1.day4.outside.pcap 79199.798770 Thu Mar 4 08:00:03 1999 920552403 Fri Mar 5 06:00:02 1999 920631602
wk1.day5.inside.pcap 79197.368381 Fri Mar 5 08:00:01 1999 920638801 Sat Mar 6 05:59:58 1999 920717998
wk1.day5.outside.pcap 79199.788688 Fri Mar 5 08:00:02 1999 920638802 Sat Mar 6 06:00:02 1999 920718002
Week 2
wk2.day1.inside.pcap 79194.416159 Mon Mar 8 08:00:00 1999 920898000 Tue Mar 9 05:59:54 1999 920977194
wk2.day1.outside.pcap 79247.843302 Mon Mar 8 08:00:01 1999 920898001 Tue Mar 9 06:00:49 1999 920977249
wk2.day2.inside.pcap 68599.660226 Tue Mar 9 08:00:01 1999 920984401 Wed Mar 10 03:03:21 1999 921053001
wk2.day2.outside.pcap 68397.777830 Tue Mar 9 08:00:01 1999 920984401 Wed Mar 10 02:59:59 1999 921052799
wk2.day3.inside.pcap 79194.939151 Wed Mar 10 08:00:02 1999 921070802 Thu Mar 11 05:59:57 1999 921149997
wk2.day3.outside.pcap 79198.605427 Wed Mar 10 08:00:03 1999 921070803 Thu Mar 11 06:00:01 1999 921150001
wk2.day4.outside.pcap 79197.414198 Thu Mar 11 08:00:03 1999 921157203 Fri Mar 12 06:00:00 1999 921236400
wk2.day5.inside.pcap 79196.548757 Fri Mar 12 08:00:01 1999 921243601 Sat Mar 13 05:59:58 1999 921322798
wk2.day5.outside.pcap 79198.411013 Fri Mar 12 08:00:02 1999 921243602 Sat Mar 13 06:00:00 1999 921322800
Week 3
wk3.day1.inside.extra.pcap 76396.316028 Mon Mar 22 08:00:02 1999 922107602 Tue Mar 23 05:13:19 1999 922183999
wk3.day1.inside.pcap 79196.697590 Mon Mar 15 08:00:01 1999 921502801 Tue Mar 16 05:59:58 1999 921581998
wk3.day1.outside.extra.pcap 76450.306697 Mon Mar 22 08:00:03 1999 922107603 Tue Mar 23 05:14:14 1999 922184054
wk3.day1.outside.pcap 79198.682477 Mon Mar 15 08:00:02 1999 921502802 Tue Mar 16 06:00:00 1999 921582000
wk3.day2.inside.extra.pcap 78999.815637 Tue Mar 23 08:00:02 1999 922194002 Wed Mar 24 05:56:42 1999 922273002
wk3.day2.inside.pcap 79195.474873 Tue Mar 16 08:00:00 1999 921589200 Wed Mar 17 05:59:55 1999 921668395
wk3.day2.outside.extra.pcap 79197.824660 Tue Mar 23 08:00:00 1999 922194000 Wed Mar 24 05:59:58 1999 922273198
wk3.day2.outside.pcap 79198.800883 Tue Mar 16 08:00:01 1999 921589201 Wed Mar 17 06:00:00 1999 921668400
wk3.day3.inside.pcap 79196.540665 Wed Mar 17 08:00:01 1999 921675601 Thu Mar 18 05:59:58 1999 921754798
wk3.day3.ouside.pcap 79197.391311 Wed Mar 17 08:00:03 1999 921675603 Thu Mar 18 06:00:00 1999 921754800
wk3.day3.outside.extra.pcap 79198.759438 Wed Mar 24 08:00:01 1999 922280401 Thu Mar 25 06:00:00 1999 922359600
wk3.day4.inside.pcap 72699.913792 Thu Mar 18 08:00:03 1999 921762003 Fri Mar 19 04:11:42 1999 921834702
wk3.day4.outside.pcap 72702.007896 Thu Mar 18 08:00:02 1999 921762002 Fri Mar 19 04:11:44 1999 921834704
wk3.day5.inside.pcap 61338.967582 Fri Mar 19 08:00:02 1999 921848402 Sat Mar 20 01:02:21 1999 921909741
Week 4
wk4.day1.inside.pcap 79195.171194 Mon Mar 29 08:00:02 1999 922712402 Tue Mar 30 05:59:57 1999 922791597
wk4.day1.outside.pcap 79197.929511 Mon Mar 29 08:00:03 1999 922712403 Tue Mar 30 06:00:01 1999 922791601
wk4.day2.outside.pcap 79198.923458 Tue Mar 30 08:00:02 1999 922798802 Wed Mar 31 06:00:01 1999 922878001
wk4.day3.inside.pcap 79188.757556 Wed Mar 31 08:00:09 1999 922885209 Thu Apr 1 05:59:57 1999 922964397
Continued on next page
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Name Duration Start Time Start End Time End
wk4.day3.outside.pcap 79197.915230 Wed Mar 31 08:00:02 1999 922885202 Thu Apr 1 06:00:00 1999 922964400
wk4.day4.inside.pcap 79188.179768 Thu Apr 1 08:00:01 1999 922971601 Fri Apr 2 05:59:49 1999 923050789
wk4.day4.outside.pcap 79198.095408 Thu Apr 1 08:00:03 1999 922971603 Fri Apr 2 06:00:01 1999 923050801
wk4.day5.inside.pcap 79192.491900 Fri Apr 2 08:00:00 1999 923058000 Sat Apr 3 05:59:53 1999 923137193
wk4.day5.outside.pcap 79198.366773 Fri Apr 2 08:00:01 1999 923058001 Sat Apr 3 06:00:00 1999 923137200
Week 5
wk5.day1.inside.pcap 79193.374094 Mon Apr 5 08:00:02 1999 923313602 Tue Apr 6 05:59:56 1999 923392796
wk5.day1.outside.pcap 79197.375906 Mon Apr 5 08:00:03 1999 923313603 Tue Apr 6 06:00:00 1999 923392800
wk5.day2.inside.pcap 79198.608846 Tue Apr 6 08:00:00 1999 923400000 Wed Apr 7 05:59:58 1999 923479198
wk5.day3.inside.pcap 79191.650256 Wed Apr 7 08:00:00 1999 923486400 Thu Apr 8 05:59:52 1999 923565592
wk5.day4.inside.pcap 79192.349066 Thu Apr 8 08:00:00 1999 923572800 Fri Apr 9 05:59:53 1999 923651993
wk5.day5.inside.pcap 79193.248408 Fri Apr 9 08:00:04 1999 923659204 Sat Apr 10 05:59:58 1999 923738398
A.4.2 Merged Data File set. The choice of oﬄine analysis allowed us to
filter the raw IDEVAL data set to include only the POP3 and SMTP protocol traffic.
We used the command line interface to Wireshark, called tshark, to filter out the
protocols under consideration from each of the daily capture files. For example:
tshark -R "tcp.port eq 25 or tcp.port eq 110"
-r <input file name>
-w <output file name>
extracts SMTP and POP3 traffic from the <input file name> and writes it to the
<output file name>.
Next we used mergecap, a command line utility also distributed with Wireshark,
to merge the filtered data into weekly summary files.
mergecap -F libpcap -w wk1.pcap ‘find . -iname "wk1.*.filtered.pcap"‘
Finally, we merged the weekly files into a cumulative trace file named total.pcap.
The characteristics merged data are summarized in Table A.3 and Table A.4.
The pre-processing workflow is shown in Figure A.2. Note that the cumulative alpha-
bet is input into weekly sample extractions to ensure that the sample strings produced
use a common alphabet.
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Figure A.2: Experimental Architecture Pre-Processing.
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Table A.3: Merged Data Files Size - Size columns are measured in bytes. The Data Rate
is measured in bytes/second.
Merged Data Files Size
Name Packets File Size Data Size Data Rate (bytes/s) Avg Size
wk1.pcap 619,215 107,546,006 97,638,542 230.02 157.68
wk2.pcap 640,110 107,405,071 97,163,287 228.85 151.79
wk3.pcap 899,064 156,829,234 142,444,186 170.55 158.44
wk4.pcap 708,272 124,405,656 113,073,280 266.94 159.65
wk5.pcap 897,033 150,206,030 135,853,478 328.73 151.45
Table A.4: Merged Data Files Time - Duration is in seconds. Start and End are specified
in Unix epoch time format. That is, they are specified in seconds since 00:00:00 UTC on
January 1, 1970.
Merged Data Files Time
Name Duration Start Time Start End Time End
wk1.pcap 424481.648063 Mon Mar 1 08:00:40 1999 920293240 Sat Mar 6 05:55:22 1999 920717722
wk2.pcap 424565.061365 Mon Mar 8 08:00:04 1999 920898004 Sat Mar 13 05:56:09 1999 921322569
wk3.pcap 835181.388736 Mon Mar 15 08:00:18 1999 921502818 Wed Mar 24 23:59:59 1999 922337999
wk4.pcap 423583.955343 Mon Mar 29 08:00:02 1999 922712402 Sat Apr 3 05:39:46 1999 923135986
wk5.pcap 413264.972580 Mon Apr 5 08:00:31 1999 923313631 Sat Apr 10 02:48:16 1999 923726896
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Table A.5: SMTP TCP Connection Summary - Note that like POP3 the weekly
pcap files do not correctly contain the entire TCP connection for several of the SMTP
connections. The Total column is NOT the sum of the row.
SMTP TCP Connection Summary
TCP Operation Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Total Percent
TCPopen 19,424 22,868 32,180 25,155 27,783 126,545 100
TCPclose 18,687 22,172 31,212 24,398 23,351 119,791 25.25
TCPreset 5 9 60 253 3,730 3,957 73.81
TCPtimeout 0 0 146 0 424 2,519 0.07
NIDSexit 732 687 762 504 278 278 0.85
Total termination conditions: 126,545
A.5 SMTP Sample Data
Table A.7: Data Summary: SMTP Command Alphabet total.pcap
Data Summary: SMTP Command Alphabet total.pcap
Type Count Percent Label Sample
1 1 0.000790233 + TCPopen EHLO MAIL RCPT DATA . TCPclose
2 1 0.000790233 + TCPopen EHLO MAIL RCPT(31) QUIT TCPclose
3 1 0.000790233 + TCPopen HELO MAIL RCPT QUIT TCPclose
4 1 0.000790233 + TCPopen HELO MAIL RCPT(6) DATA . QUIT TCPclose
5 1 0.000790233 + TCPopen HELO MAIL RCPT(7) DATA . QUIT TCPclose
6 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT TCPtimeout
7 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT(11) DATA TCPtimeout
8 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT(2) DATA . NIDSexit
9 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT(20) TCPtimeout
10 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen EHLO HELO TCPtimeout
11 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen EHLO MAIL RCPT DATA . TCPreset
12 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen EHLO MAIL RCPT DATA . TCPtimeout
13 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen EHLO MAIL RCPT DATA NIDSexit
14 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen EHLO MAIL TCPtimeout
15 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen EHLO TCPtimeout
16 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen HELO MAIL RCPT DATA . QUIT NIDSexit
17 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen HELO MAIL TCPtimeout
18 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen HELO TCPtimeout
19 2 0.00158047 + TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT(7) DATA . QUIT TCPclose
20 2 0.00158047 + TCPopen EHLO MAIL RCPT(2) QUIT TCPclose
21 2 0.00158047 + TCPopen EHLO MAIL RCPT(4) QUIT TCPclose
22 2 0.00158047 - TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT DATA . QUIT TCPtimeout
23 2 0.00158047 - TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT DATA TCPreset
24 2 0.00158047 - TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT(5) DATA TCPclose
25 2 0.00158047 - TCPopen EHLO MAIL RCPT(7) DATA TCPclose
26 2 0.00158047 - TCPopen HELO MAIL RCPT DATA . QUIT TCPtimeout
27 2 0.00158047 - TCPopen mail TCPclose
28 3 0.0023707 + TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT DATA . RSET MAIL RCPT DATA .
RSET MAIL RCPT DATA . RSET MAIL RCPT DATA . RSET MAIL RCPT
DATA . RSET MAIL RCPT DATA . QUIT TCPclose
29 3 0.0023707 - TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT DATA NIDSexit
30 3 0.0023707 - TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT(2) DATA . TCPtimeout
31 3 0.0023707 - TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT(30) DATA . TCPtimeout
32 3 0.0023707 - TCPopen HELP TCPclose
Continued on next page
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33 4 0.00316093 + TCPopen EHLO MAIL RCPT(3) QUIT TCPclose
34 4 0.00316093 + TCPopen HELO MAIL RCPT(4) DATA . QUIT TCPclose
35 4 0.00316093 - TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT(3) DATA TCPclose
36 4 0.00316093 - TCPopen EHLO MAIL RCPT DATA TCPclose
37 5 0.00395116 + TCPopen HELO MAIL RCPT(5) DATA . QUIT TCPclose
38 6 0.0047414 + TCPopen EHLO MAIL RCPT(30) QUIT TCPclose
39 6 0.0047414 - TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT DATA . NIDSexit
40 6 0.0047414 - TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT(30) DATA TCPtimeout
41 6 0.0047414 - TCPopen QUIT TCPclose
42 7 0.00553163 + TCPopen EHLO MAIL RCPT RSET QUIT TCPclose
43 10 0.00790233 - TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT(2) DATA TCPclose
44 20 0.0158047 + TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT(31) DATA . QUIT TCPclose
45 21 0.0165949 - TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT DATA . QUIT TCPreset
46 23 0.0181754 - TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT DATA TCPtimeout
47 26 0.0205461 - TCPopen TCPtimeout
48 33 0.0260777 - TCPopen NIDSexit
49 36 0.0284484 + TCPopen HELO MAIL RCPT(3) DATA . QUIT TCPclose
50 57 0.0450433 + TCPopen EHLO MAIL RCPT(4) DATA . QUIT TCPclose
51 58 0.0458335 - TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT DATA . TCPreset
52 64 0.0505749 - TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT DATA TCPclose
53 65 0.0513651 + TCPopen EHLO MAIL RCPT(3) DATA . QUIT TCPclose
54 93 0.0734916 + TCPopen EHLO MAIL RCPT(7) DATA . QUIT TCPclose
55 103 0.081394 + TCPopen EHLO MAIL RCPT QUIT TCPclose
56 112 0.0885061 + TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT(6) DATA . QUIT TCPclose
57 185 0.146193 + TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT(5) DATA . QUIT TCPclose
58 189 0.149354 + TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT(11) DATA . QUIT TCPclose
59 190 0.150144 + TCPopen EHLO MAIL RCPT(10) DATA . QUIT TCPclose
60 199 0.157256 + TCPopen EHLO MAIL RCPT(24) DATA . QUIT TCPclose
61 212 0.167529 + TCPopen HELO MAIL RCPT(2) DATA . QUIT TCPclose
62 233 0.184124 - TCPopen HELO MAIL RCPT DATA . NIDSexit
63 242 0.191236 - TCPopen HELO MAIL RCPT DATA . TCPreset
64 433 0.342171 + TCPopen EHLO MAIL RCPT(2) DATA . QUIT TCPclose
65 449 0.354814 - TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT DATA . TCPtimeout
66 560 0.44253 + TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT(4) DATA . QUIT TCPclose
67 1494 1.18061 + TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT(30) DATA . QUIT TCPclose
68 1670 1.31969 - TCPopen mail rcpt TCPclose
69 1933 1.52752 + TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT(3) DATA . QUIT TCPclose
70 1996 1.5773 - TCPopen HELO MAIL RCPT DATA . TCPtimeout
71 3150 2.48923 + TCPopen HELO MAIL RCPT DATA . QUIT TCPclose
72 3155 2.49318 - TCPopen TCPclose
73 3633 2.87092 - TCPopen TCPreset
74 3887 3.07163 + TCPopen EHLO MAIL RCPT DATA . QUIT TCPclose
75 7389 5.83903 + TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT(2) DATA . QUIT TCPclose
76 94522 74.6944 + TCPopen EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT DATA . QUIT TCPclose
76 Start with: TCPopen
45 End with: TCPclose (119,791 samples)
6 End with: TCPreset (3,957 samples)
18 End with: TCPtimeout (2,519 samples )
7 End with: NIDSexit (278 samples )
34 Positive sample Types. 114,869 Positive samples.
42 Negative sample Types. 11,676 Negative samples.
126,545 Total Samples
76 Unique Types
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Table A.8: Data Summary: SMTP Reply Alphabet total.pcap
Data Summary: SMTP Reply Alphabet total.pcap
Type Count Percent Label Sample
1 1 0.000790233 + TCPopen 220 250(2) 551(31) 221 TCPclose
2 1 0.000790233 + TCPopen 220 250(3) 354 250 TCPclose
3 1 0.000790233 + TCPopen 220 250(8) 354 250 221 TCPclose
4 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 250(3) 354 250 221 NIDSexit
5 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 250(3) 354 250 TCPreset
6 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 250(3) 354 552 NIDSexit
7 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 250(3) 354 552 TCPtimeout
8 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 250(3) 503 500 221 TCPclose
9 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 500 250 TCPtimeout
10 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 500 250(13) 354 250 221 TCPtimeout
11 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 500 250(2) TCPtimeout
12 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 500 250(21) TCPtimeout
13 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 500 250(3) 354 250(2) NIDSexit
14 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 500 250(3) TCPtimeout
15 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 500 250(32) 354 TCPtimeout
16 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 500 250(4) 354 NIDSexit
17 2 0.00158047 + TCPopen 220 250(2) 551(2) 221 TCPclose
18 2 0.00158047 + TCPopen 220 250(2) 551(4) 221 TCPclose
19 2 0.00158047 + TCPopen 220 500 250(9) 354 250 221 TCPclose
20 2 0.00158047 - TCPopen 220 250 TCPtimeout
21 2 0.00158047 - TCPopen 220 250(2) 503 500 221 TCPclose
22 2 0.00158047 - TCPopen 220 250(3) 354 250 221 TCPtimeout
23 2 0.00158047 - TCPopen 220 451 TCPreset
24 2 0.00158047 - TCPopen 220 500 250(3) 354 250 221 NIDSexit
25 3 0.0023707 + TCPopen 220 500 250(3) 354 250(4) 354 250(4) 354 250(4) 354 250(4) 354 250(4)
354 250 221 TCPclose
26 3 0.0023707 - TCPopen 220 500 250(3) 354 250 TCPtimeout
27 3 0.0023707 - TCPopen 220 500 250(4) 354 250 221 TCPtimeout
28 4 0.00316093 + TCPopen 220 250(2) 551(3) 221 TCPclose
29 5 0.00395116 + TCPopen 220 250(7) 354 250 221 TCPclose
30 6 0.0047414 + TCPopen 220 250(2) 551(30) 221 TCPclose
31 6 0.0047414 - TCPopen 220 221 TCPclose
32 6 0.0047414 - TCPopen 220 500 250(3) 354 NIDSexit
33 6 0.0047414 - TCPopen 220 TCPclose
34 7 0.00553163 + TCPopen 220 250(2) 551 250 221 TCPclose
35 8 0.00632186 - TCPopen 220 500 250(32) 354 250 221 TCPtimeout
36 10 0.00790233 - TCPopen 220 TCPtimeout
37 11 0.00869256 - TCPopen 220 500 250(3) 354 250 221 TCPtimeout
38 18 0.0142242 - TCPopen TCPtimeout
39 20 0.0158047 + TCPopen 220 500 250(33) 354 250 221 TCPclose
40 22 0.0173851 - TCPopen 220 500 250(3) 354 250 TCPreset
41 25 0.0197558 - TCPopen 220 250(2) 354 250 TCPclose
42 33 0.0260777 + TCPopen 220 250(3) 354 250(2) TCPclose
43 33 0.0260777 - TCPopen NIDSexit
44 37 0.0292386 - TCPopen 220 451 421 TCPreset
45 59 0.0466237 - TCPopen 220 500 250(3) 354 TCPreset
46 61 0.0482042 + TCPopen 220 250(6) 354 250 221 TCPclose
47 75 0.0592675 - TCPopen TCPreset
48 96 0.0758623 + TCPopen 220 250(9) 354 250 221 TCPclose
49 101 0.0798135 + TCPopen 220 250(5) 354 250 221 TCPclose
Continued on next page
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50 104 0.0821842 + TCPopen 220 250(2) 551 221 TCPclose
51 112 0.0885061 + TCPopen 220 500 250(8) 354 250 221 TCPclose
52 153 0.120906 - TCPopen TCPclose
53 170 0.13434 - TCPopen 220 451 421 TCPclose
54 187 0.147774 + TCPopen 220 500 250(7) 354 250 221 TCPclose
55 189 0.149354 + TCPopen 220 500 250(13) 354 250 221 TCPclose
56 190 0.150144 + TCPopen 220 250(12) 354 250 221 TCPclose
57 199 0.157256 + TCPopen 220 250(26) 354 250 221 TCPclose
58 209 0.165159 - TCPopen 220 421 TCPreset
59 233 0.184124 - TCPopen 220 250(3) 354 NIDSexit
60 242 0.191236 - TCPopen 220 250(3) 354 TCPreset
61 459 0.362717 - TCPopen 220 500 250(3) 354 TCPtimeout
62 560 0.44253 + TCPopen 220 500 250(6) 354 250 221 TCPclose
63 645 0.5097 + TCPopen 220 250(4) 354 250 221 TCPclose
64 1494 1.18061 + TCPopen 220 500 250(32) 354 250 221 TCPclose
65 1937 1.53068 + TCPopen 220 500 250(5) 354 250 221 TCPclose
66 1996 1.5773 - TCPopen 220 250(3) 354 TCPtimeout
67 3310 2.61567 - TCPopen 220 TCPreset
68 4473 3.53471 - TCPopen 220 250(2) 354 250 221 TCPclose
69 7008 5.53795 + TCPopen 220 250(3) 354 250 221 TCPclose
70 7399 5.84693 + TCPopen 220 500 250(4) 354 250 221 TCPclose
71 14633 11.5635 + TCPopen 220 500 250(3) 354 250(2) TCPclose
72 79953 63.1815 + TCPopen 220 500 250(3) 354 250 221 TCPclose
72 Start with: TCPopen
38 End with: TCPclose (119,791 samples)
9 End with: TCPreset (3,957 samples)
17 End with: TCPtimeout (2,519 samples )
8 End with: NIDSexit (278 samples )
30 Positive sample Types. 114,955 Positive samples.
42 Negative sample Types. 11,590 Negative samples.
126,545 Total Samples
72 Unique Types
Table A.9: Data Summary: SMTP Composite Alphabet total.pcap
Data Summary: SMTP Composite Alphabet total.pcap
Type Count Percent Label Sample
1 1 0.000790233 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250 TCPclose
2 1 0.000790233 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT
551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT
551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT
551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT
551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 QUIT
221 TCPclose
3 1 0.000790233 + TCPopen 220 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250 QUIT 221 TCPclose
4 1 0.000790233 + TCPopen 220 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250 QUIT 221 TCPclose
5 1 0.000790233 + TCPopen 220 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 551 QUIT 221 TCPclose
6 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 250(3) 503 HELP 500 221 TCPclose
Continued on next page
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7 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 500 250(3) 354 250 221 TCPtimeout
8 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250 221 TCPtime-
out
9 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250 TCPreset
10 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 250 221 NIDSexit
11 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 250 MAIL TCPtimeout
12 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250
QUIT TCPtimeout
13 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250
TCPreset
14 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 250(2)
NIDSexit
15 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA TCPtimeout
16 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 DATA
354 . NIDSexit
17 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 250 221 TCPtimeout
18 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 DATA
354 . TCPtimeout
19 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT TCPtimeout
20 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT TCPtimeout
21 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 TCPtimeout
22 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 EHLO HELO MAIL RCPT DATA . QUIT TCPtimeout
23 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 EHLO TCPtimeout
24 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250 QUIT 221
TCPtimeout
25 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 552 QUIT NIDSexit
26 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 552 . QUIT TCPti-
meout
27 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 HELO 250 MAIL TCPtimeout
28 1 0.000790233 - TCPopen 220 HELO TCPtimeout
29 2 0.00158047 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 QUIT 221 TCPclose
30 2 0.00158047 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT
551 QUIT 221 TCPclose
31 2 0.00158047 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250 QUIT 221
TCPclose
32 2 0.00158047 - TCPopen 220 250(2) 503 HELP 500 221 TCPclose
33 2 0.00158047 - TCPopen 220 451 TCPreset
34 2 0.00158047 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 250 221 TCPclose
35 2 0.00158047 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250
TCPtimeout
36 2 0.00158047 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 250 221
NIDSexit
37 2 0.00158047 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 TCPreset
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38 2 0.00158047 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 250 221 TCPclose
39 2 0.00158047 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 DATA
354 . 250 221 TCPtimeout
40 2 0.00158047 - TCPopen 220 mail 250(2) 354 250 221 TCPclose
41 3 0.0023707 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250
RSET 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250 RSET 250 MAIL 250 RCPT
250 DATA 354 . 250 RSET 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250 RSET
250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250 RSET 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250
DATA 354 . 250 QUIT 221 TCPclose
42 3 0.0023707 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 DATA
354 . 250 221 TCPtimeout
43 4 0.00316093 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 QUIT
221 TCPclose
44 4 0.00316093 + TCPopen 220 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 DATA 354 . 250 QUIT 221 TCPclose
45 4 0.00316093 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 250 221 TCPclose
46 4 0.00316093 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250 221
TCPtimeout
47 4 0.00316093 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 DATA 354 250 221 TCPclose
48 5 0.00395116 + TCPopen 220 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250 QUIT 221 TCPclose
49 6 0.0047414 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551
RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551
RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551
RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551
RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 RCPT 551 QUIT 221 TCPclose
50 6 0.0047414 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . NIDSexit
51 6 0.0047414 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 250 221
TCPtimeout
52 6 0.0047414 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 DATA
354 250 221 TCPtimeout
53 6 0.0047414 - TCPopen 220 TCPclose
54 6 0.0047414 - TCPopen QUIT 220 221 TCPclose
55 7 0.00553163 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 551 RSET 250 QUIT 221 TCPclose
56 7 0.00553163 - TCPopen 220 TCPtimeout
57 10 0.00790233 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 DATA
354 250 221 TCPclose
58 12 0.00948279 - TCPopen 220 250(2) 354 250 TCPclose
59 13 0.010273 - TCPopen 220 mail 250 rcpt 250 354 250 TCPclose
60 16 0.0126437 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 TCPti-
meout
61 18 0.0142242 - TCPopen TCPtimeout
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62 20 0.0158047 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 DATA 354 . 250 QUIT 221 TCPclose
63 21 0.0165949 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250
QUIT TCPreset
64 33 0.0260777 + TCPopen 220 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250 QUIT 250
TCPclose
65 33 0.0260777 - TCPopen NIDSexit
66 36 0.0284484 + TCPopen 220 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 DATA
354 . 250 QUIT 221 TCPclose
67 37 0.0292386 - TCPopen 220 451 421 TCPreset
68 57 0.0450433 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 DATA 354 . 250 QUIT 221 TCPclose
69 57 0.0450433 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . TCP-
reset
70 64 0.0505749 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 250 221
TCPclose
71 65 0.0513651 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 DATA
354 . 250 QUIT 221 TCPclose
72 75 0.0592675 - TCPopen TCPreset
73 93 0.0734916 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250 QUIT 221 TCPclose
74 103 0.081394 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 551 QUIT 221 TCPclose
75 112 0.0885061 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250 QUIT 221 TCPclose
76 153 0.120906 - TCPopen TCPclose
77 170 0.13434 - TCPopen 220 451 421 TCPclose
78 185 0.146193 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250 QUIT 221 TCPclose
79 189 0.149354 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250 QUIT 221 TCPclose
80 190 0.150144 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 DATA
354 . 250 QUIT 221 TCPclose
81 199 0.157256 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 DATA
354 . 250 QUIT 221 TCPclose
82 209 0.165159 - TCPopen 220 421 TCPreset
83 212 0.167529 + TCPopen 220 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250
QUIT 221 TCPclose
84 233 0.184124 - TCPopen 220 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . NIDSexit
85 242 0.191236 - TCPopen 220 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . TCPreset
86 433 0.342171 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250
QUIT 221 TCPclose
87 443 0.350073 - TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . TCP-
timeout
88 560 0.44253 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250 QUIT 221 TCPclose
Continued on next page
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Table A.9 – continued from previous page
Type Count Percent Label Sample
89 1494 1.18061 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 DATA
354 . 250 QUIT 221 TCPclose
90 1657 1.30942 - TCPopen 220 mail 250 rcpt 250 354 250 221 TCPclose
91 1933 1.52752 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 RCPT
250 DATA 354 . 250 QUIT 221 TCPclose
92 1996 1.5773 - TCPopen 220 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . TCPtimeout
93 2814 2.22371 - TCPopen 220 250(2) 354 250 221 TCPclose
94 3117 2.46316 + TCPopen 220 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250 QUIT 221
TCPclose
95 3310 2.61567 - TCPopen 220 TCPreset
96 3887 3.07163 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250 QUIT 221
TCPclose
97 7389 5.83903 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 RCPT 250 DATA
354 . 250 QUIT 221 TCPclose
98 14633 11.5635 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250
QUIT 250 TCPclose
99 79889 63.1309 + TCPopen 220 EHLO 500 HELO 250 MAIL 250 RCPT 250 DATA 354 . 250
QUIT 221 TCPclose
99 Start with: TCPopen
53 End with: TCPclose (119,791 samples)
11 End with: TCPreset (3,957 samples)
27 End with: TCPtimeout (2,519 samples )
8 End with: NIDSexit (278 samples )
36 Positive sample Types. 114,869 Positive samples.
63 Negative sample Types. 11,676 Negative samples.
126,545 Total Samples
99 Unique Types
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Table A.10: POP3 TCP Connection Summary - Note that the weekly trace files do
not include the complete TCP connection for all POP3 sessions. The Total column
does NOT sum the row.
POP3 TCP Connection Summary
TCP Operation Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Total Percent
TCPopen 255 238 395 363 9,709 10,960 100
TCPclose 254 236 395 363 1,520 2,768 25.25
TCPreset 0 1 0 0 8,089 8,090 73.81
TCPtimeout 0 0 0 0 6 8 0.07
NIDSexit 1 1 0 0 94 94 0.85
Total termination conditions: 10,960
A.6 POP3 Sample Data
Table A.12: Data Summary: POP3 Command Alphabet total.pcap
Data Summary: POP3 Command Alphabet total.pcap
Type Count Percent Label Sample
1 1 0.00912409 + TCPopen USER PASS STAT RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR
DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE
RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR
DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE QUIT TCPclose
2 1 0.00912409 - TCPopen QUIT TCPtimeout
3 1 0.00912409 - TCPopen USER PASS STAT RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR
DELE RETR DELE QUIT TCPtimeout
4 1 0.00912409 - TCPopen USER PASS STAT RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR
DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE
RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR
DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE QUIT TCPtimeout
5 2 0.0182482 + TCPopen USER PASS STAT RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR
DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE
RETR DELE RETR DELE QUIT TCPclose
6 2 0.0182482 + TCPopen USER PASS STAT RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR
DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE
RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE QUIT TCPclose
7 2 0.0182482 + TCPopen USER PASS STAT RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR
DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE
RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE QUIT
TCPclose
8 2 0.0182482 + TCPopen USER PASS STAT RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR
DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE
RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR
DELE RETR DELE QUIT TCPclose
9 2 0.0182482 + TCPopen USER PASS STAT RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR
DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE
RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR
DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE QUIT TCPclose
10 2 0.0182482 + TCPopen USER PASS STAT RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR
DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE
RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR
DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE
RETR DELE RETR DELE QUIT TCPclose
Continued on next page
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Table A.12 – continued from previous page
Type Count Percent Label Sample
11 2 0.0182482 + TCPopen USER PASS STAT RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR
DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE
RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR
DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE
RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE QUIT
TCPclose
12 2 0.0182482 - TCPopen QUIT TCPclose
13 2 0.0182482 - TCPopen USER TCPreset
14 5 0.0456204 + TCPopen USER PASS STAT RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR
DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE
QUIT TCPclose
15 5 0.0456204 - TCPopen TCPtimeout
16 9 0.0821168 + TCPopen USER PASS STAT RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR
DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE QUIT TCPclose
17 25 0.228102 + TCPopen USER PASS STAT RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR
DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE QUIT TCPclose
18 32 0.291971 + TCPopen USER PASS STAT RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR
DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE QUIT TCPclose
19 47 0.428832 + TCPopen USER PASS STAT RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR
DELE RETR DELE QUIT TCPclose
20 69 0.629562 + TCPopen USER PASS STAT RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR
DELE QUIT TCPclose
21 94 0.857664 - TCPopen NIDSexit
22 136 1.24088 + TCPopen USER PASS STAT RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE QUIT
TCPclose
23 197 1.79745 + TCPopen USER PASS STAT RETR DELE RETR DELE QUIT TCPclose
24 342 3.12044 + TCPopen USER PASS STAT RETR DELE QUIT TCPclose
25 631 5.7573 + TCPopen USER PASS STAT QUIT TCPclose
26 1258 11.4781 - TCPopen TCPclose
27 8088 73.7956 - TCPopen TCPreset
27 Start with: TCPopen
20 End with: TCPclose (2,768 samples)
2 End with: TCPreset (8,090 samples)
4 End with: TCPtimeout (8 samples )
1 End with: NIDSexit (94 samples )
18 Positive sample Types. 1,508 Positive samples.
9 Negative sample Types. 9,452 Negative samples.
10,960 Total Samples
27 Unique Types
Table A.13: Data Summary: POP3 Reply Alphabet total.pcap
Data Summary: POP3 Reply Alphabet total.pcap
Type Count Percent Label Sample
1 1 0.00912409 + TCPopen OK(41) TCPclose
2 1 0.00912409 - TCPopen OK(2) TCPclose
3 1 0.00912409 - TCPopen OK(2) TCPtimeout
4 2 0.0182482 + TCPopen OK(27) TCPclose
5 2 0.0182482 + TCPopen OK(29) TCPclose
6 2 0.0182482 + TCPopen OK(33) TCPclose
7 2 0.0182482 + TCPopen OK(37) TCPclose
Continued on next page
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Table A.13 – continued from previous page
Type Count Percent Label Sample
8 2 0.0182482 + TCPopen OK(43) TCPclose
9 2 0.0182482 + TCPopen OK(49) TCPclose
10 2 0.0182482 + TCPopen OK(55) TCPclose
11 2 0.0182482 - TCPopen OK(15) TCPtimeout
12 5 0.0456204 + TCPopen OK(23) TCPclose
13 5 0.0456204 - TCPopen TCPtimeout
14 9 0.0821168 + TCPopen OK(21) TCPclose
15 15 0.136861 - TCPopen TCPreset
16 25 0.228102 + TCPopen OK(19) TCPclose
17 32 0.291971 + TCPopen OK(17) TCPclose
18 47 0.428832 + TCPopen OK(15) TCPclose
19 60 0.547445 - TCPopen OK(2) ERR TCPclose
20 69 0.629562 + TCPopen OK(13) TCPclose
21 94 0.857664 - TCPopen NIDSexit
22 136 1.24088 + TCPopen OK(11) TCPclose
23 197 1.79745 + TCPopen OK(9) TCPclose
24 342 3.12044 + TCPopen OK(7) TCPclose
25 631 5.7573 + TCPopen OK(5) TCPclose
26 1199 10.9398 - TCPopen TCPclose
27 8075 73.677 - TCPopen OK TCPreset
27 Start with: TCPopen
21 End with: TCPclose (2,768 samples)
2 End with: TCPreset (8,090 samples)
3 End with: TCPtimeout (8 samples )
1 End with: NIDSexit (94 samples )
18 Positive sample Types. 1,508 Positive samples.
9 Negative sample Types. 9,452 Negative samples.
10,960 Total Samples
27 Unique Types
Table A.14: Data Summary: POP3 Composite Alphabet total.pcap
Data Summary: POP3 Composite Alphabet total.pcap
Type Count Percent Label Sample
1 1 0.00912409 + TCPopen OK USER OK PASS OK STAT OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK
RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK
RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK QUIT OK TCPclose
2 1 0.00912409 - TCPopen OK USER OK PASS OK STAT OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK
QUIT OK TCPtimeout
3 1 0.00912409 - TCPopen OK USER OK PASS OK STAT OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR
OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE
OK RETR OK DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE
RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE RETR
DELE RETR DELE RETR DELE QUIT TCPtimeout
4 1 0.00912409 - TCPopen QUIT OK(2) TCPclose
5 1 0.00912409 - TCPopen QUIT OK(2) TCPtimeout
Continued on next page
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Table A.14 – continued from previous page
Type Count Percent Label Sample
6 1 0.00912409 - TCPopen QUIT TCPclose
7 2 0.0182482 + TCPopen OK USER OK PASS OK STAT OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK
RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK QUIT OK TCPclose
8 2 0.0182482 + TCPopen OK USER OK PASS OK STAT OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK
RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK
QUIT OK TCPclose
9 2 0.0182482 + TCPopen OK USER OK PASS OK STAT OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK
RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK
RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK QUIT OK TCPclose
10 2 0.0182482 + TCPopen OK USER OK PASS OK STAT OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK
RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK
RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK QUIT OK TCPclose
11 2 0.0182482 + TCPopen OK USER OK PASS OK STAT OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK
RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK
RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK
QUIT OK TCPclose
12 2 0.0182482 + TCPopen OK USER OK PASS OK STAT OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK
RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK
RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK
RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK QUIT OK
TCPclose
13 2 0.0182482 + TCPopen OK USER OK PASS OK STAT OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK
RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK
RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK
RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK QUIT OK TCPclose
14 2 0.0182482 - TCPopen OK USER TCPreset
15 5 0.0456204 + TCPopen OK USER OK PASS OK STAT OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK
RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK QUIT OK TCPclose
16 5 0.0456204 - TCPopen TCPtimeout
17 9 0.0821168 + TCPopen OK USER OK PASS OK STAT OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK
RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK QUIT OK
TCPclose
18 15 0.136861 - TCPopen TCPreset
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Table A.14 – continued from previous page
Type Count Percent Label Sample
19 25 0.228102 + TCPopen OK USER OK PASS OK STAT OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK
RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK QUIT OK TCPclose
20 32 0.291971 + TCPopen OK USER OK PASS OK STAT OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK
RETR OK DELE OK QUIT OK TCPclose
21 47 0.428832 + TCPopen OK USER OK PASS OK STAT OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK
QUIT OK TCPclose
22 60 0.547445 - TCPopen OK(2) ERR TCPclose
23 69 0.629562 + TCPopen OK USER OK PASS OK STAT OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK QUIT OK TCPclose
24 94 0.857664 - TCPopen NIDSexit
25 136 1.24088 + TCPopen OK USER OK PASS OK STAT OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK RETR OK DELE OK QUIT OK TCPclose
26 197 1.79745 + TCPopen OK USER OK PASS OK STAT OK RETR OK DELE OK RETR OK
DELE OK QUIT OK TCPclose
27 342 3.12044 + TCPopen OK USER OK PASS OK STAT OK RETR OK DELE OK QUIT OK
TCPclose
28 631 5.7573 + TCPopen OK USER OK PASS OK STAT OK QUIT OK TCPclose
29 1198 10.9307 - TCPopen TCPclose
30 8073 73.6588 - TCPopen OK TCPreset
30 Start with: TCPopen
22 End with: TCPclose (2,768 samples)
3 End with: TCPreset (8,090 samples)
4 End with: TCPtimeout (8 samples )
1 End with: NIDSexit (94 samples )
18 Positive sample Types. 1,508 Positive samples.
12 Negative sample Types. 9,452 Negative samples.
10,960 Total Samples
30 Unique Types
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Appendix B. Low Level Implementation
This appendix introduces supporting toolkits we reviewed, as well as the environment
and tools used in the development process. Finally, we briefly introduce a low level
look at flowtool and flowinfer.
B.1 Sources for Protocol Formats
There are rich repositories we can mine for protocol format information. Several
open source projects for trace collection and intrusion detection provide source code.
Wireshark contains a large body of protocol formats (approximately 700 at this
time) that have been gleaned from open specifications, source code, and community
reverse engineering efforts [48]. JNetStream specifies network protocol formats in a
description language called Network Protocol Language (NPL) [19]. The NPL speci-
fications are compiled to Java class files by the included nplc compiler [19]. Netdude
supports protocol formats that are hardcoded in c source and PHDL, a packet header
description language [133]. Both Wireshark and jNetStream are protocol analyzers
while Netdude concentrates on packet trace manipulation and presentation over anal-
ysis.
Bro is a research oriented Intrusion Detection System [140]. Bro provides the
protocol description language binpac, a binpac language compiler, and protocol de-
scriptions with it source code [140, 192]. The binpac protocol descriptions cover a
range of ASCII text and binary protocols. Snort is another popular open source IDS
that embodies hand coded application layer protocol parsers [98].
There are also several data description languages that are potentially useful for
describing ad hoc mixed binary and text data such as protocol formats. Fisher et
al propose automated inference of ad hoc data to generate PADS data description
language [81]. PacketTypes is another data description language specifically designed
for specifying network protocol messages [164]. DataScript is a specification language
for binary data formats [13]. Other options include direct use of Augmented BNF or
Abstract Syntax Notation number One (ASN.1).
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B.2 Automata Toolkits
There are several frameworks that contain foundational language theoretic ele-
ments but do not include GI algorithms.
B.2.1 AMoRE. AMoRE [161] is used by Berg [23, Section 4] as the basis for
both a direct implementation and domain optimized version of Angluin’s learner. The
AMoRE library is implemented as a library in portable C. While the AMoRE source
code is available the build system was not compatible with the build system on our
development system. For testing purposes we ported the build system to autoconf1.
AMoRE was also used by the MERLin Project [267].
B.2.2 Vaucanson. Vaucanson2 is a C++ based automata library maintained
by the EPITA Research and Development Laboratory (the same research group also
maintains the Mical GI package) [86]. The version available to the public at the time of
writing is 1.1.1. Lombardy [152] explains Vaucanson in detail and provides comparison
to the AMoRE library. An early version of Vaucanson provides the automata engine
for the Mical GI package [213].
B.2.3 JFLAP. JFLAP is an automata learning tool implemented in Java
that supports many of the core operations required for grammatical inference [218,
219]. Source code for version 4 is available for download but source code for newer
versions 5 and 6 must be requested from the author [219]. JFLAP 4 is used in the
kBehavior algorithm implementation [158,198].
B.2.4 Grail. Grail [276] and it’s more recent incarnation as Grail+ [285]
provide a range of useful automata operations. Unfortunately, the C++ source code
is rather dated and the build system does not support our development platform. A
modified version of Grail version 2.5 was created by the MERLin Project to study
1Autoconf – http://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/
2Vaucanson < Project – http://www.lrde.epita.fr/cgi-bin/twiki/view/Projects/
Vaucanson
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generalized NFA [267]. The modified version provides build targets for Linux but not
for contemporary versions of GCC.
B.3 Grammatical Inference Implementations
While there is no single definitive collection of GI algorithms source code for
several of the algorithms discussed above are available. Also, LearnLib and Mical
frameworks each provide a subset of the GI algorithms.
B.3.1 LearnLib. LearnLib3 is a C++ library [211] that provides an architec-
ture for GI algorithm testing. Because the library is designed using Common Object
Request Broker Architecture (CORBA)4 interfaces it can be used from any language
with CORBA support. At this time it only implements Angluin’s L∗ and a mod-
ified L∗. LearnLib is incorporated into the Formal Methods for Industrial Critical
Systems-Java Electronic Tool Integration (FMICS-jETI5) platform to support model
design recovery with Smyle [157]. While the CORBA interface is currently exposed
on the Internet and sample uses are available in example source code; the source code
for the library does not appear to be available to the public.
B.3.2 Mical. Mical is a C++ library of grammatical inference algorithms
including k-TSSI, k-RI, MGGI, and RPNI [213]. The library extensively utilizes C++
template mechanisms that are compatible with GCC6 version 3.2 and version 3.3 but
not newer versions of the GCC toolchain (currently version 4.2.2). The only publicly
released version of the software is version 0.1 from 10 July 2003 [213]. The library
also implements a range of functions internally including: creation of MCA, creation
of PTA, and conversion of MCA to PTA [213]. We attempted, unsuccessfully, to
build the library with relaxed C++ dialect options 7 available in GCC version 4.2.2.
3LearnLib – http://faelis.cs.uni-dortmund.de/
4CORBA FAQ – http://www.omg.org/gettingstarted/corbafaq.htm
5FMICS-jETI – http://jeti.cs.uni-dortmund.de/fmics/
6GCC, the GNU Compiler Collection - http://gcc.gnu.org
7-fpermissive, etc. . ., see [85, Section 3.5]
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We were able to build and evaluate the library by creating a parallel installation
of GCC version 3.3.6. Mical uses a modified version of the Vaucanson automata
library included with its source code and is not compatible with current versions of
Vaucanson [86].
B.3.3 Other Implementations. Implementations of several other algorithms
publicly available. Ammons provides C source code for k-tails and sk-strings for PFSA
inference [6]. C source code for Algeria, a stochastic automata inference algorithm [94],
RPNI, and k-tails is available from [225]. Mariani and Pezze´ provide source for
kBehavior and kTails8. Their algorithms are implemented in Java [158, 198] and use
JFLAP version 4 for automata support [219].
B.4 Implementation Language
The choice of implementation language was driven by the selection of support
packages and our familiarity with C and C++. The choice of development environ-
ment was driven by the implementation language. We primarily used Eclipse9 version
3.2, KDevelop10 version 3.5.0, and various text editors on an openSUSE 11 version 10.3
Linux computer. We used Concurrent Versions System (CVS) for revision control.
B.5 Low Level Implementation
Our proof of concept low level implementation is comprised for two programs,
flowtool and flowinfer, and associated driver scripts. Flowtool process raw pcap trace
files and produces alphabet and sample string files for input into flowinfer.
B.5.1 flowtool. Flowtool is a C language program using GLib version 2.1412
standard data structures for dynamic storage and libnids for TCP connection re-
8k-tails is also covered by [99]
9Eclipse – http://www.eclipse.org
10KDevelop – http://www.kdevelop.org/
11openSUSE – http://www.opensuse.org
12GLib Reference Manual - http://library.gnome.org/devel/glib/2.14/
117
Figure B.1: Flowtool verbose sample output.
# Sample Type-6
# Protocol: 25 Server 172.16.114.50 Client 152.204.242.193.1941
# Key = 172.16.114.50:25,152.204.242.193:1941: 923693227.228408
# Start: 923693227.228408
# End: 923693238.320118
# Wireshark filter:(ip.addr eq 172.16.114.50 and ip.addr eq 152.204.242.193) and (tcp.port eq 25 and tcp.port eq 1941)
- TCPopen 220 250 250 250 503 HELP 500 221 TCPclose
# Sample Type-32
# Protocol: 25 Server 172.16.114.50 Client 202.49.244.10.1027
# Key = 172.16.114.50:25,202.49.244.10:1027: 922715292.597701
# Start: 922715292.597701
# End: 922715294.666466
# Wireshark filter:(ip.addr eq 172.16.114.50 and ip.addr eq 202.49.244.10) and (tcp.port eq 25 and tcp.port eq 1027)
- TCPopen 220 250 250 503 HELP 500 221 TCPclose
# Sample Type-32
# Protocol: 25 Server 172.16.114.50 Client 202.49.244.10.1027
# Key = 172.16.114.50:25,202.49.244.10:1027: 922715290.284924
# Start: 922715290.284924
# End: 922715292.352719
# Wireshark filter:(ip.addr eq 172.16.114.50 and ip.addr eq 202.49.244.10) and (tcp.port eq 25 and tcp.port eq 1027)
- TCPopen 220 250 250 503 HELP 500 221 TCPclose
.
assembly and defragmentation. An elided call graph from main of flowtool is shown
in Figure B.2.
As the libnids library creates the connection level flow the application session
samples are incrementally created by parsing the application data flow. As previously
mentioned, because the code is a proof of concept we chose to implement hand-coded
operator parsers derived from specification documents and heuristics from Wireshark
and Bro. Once the application level traffic is parsed we write out the alphabet of
the protocol under consideration and the sample strings of operators, replies, and the
composite of operators intermixed with replies. The different sample types are written
to separate flat text files. Flowtool verbose sample output is shown in Figure B.1
Flowtool was developed using the KDevelop IDE and autoconf build system.
The C source code supports the Doxygen documentation system.
B.5.2 flowinfer. We developed the C++ language program called flowinfer
for automata inference. We chose the mical GI toolkit as the basis of flowinfer. Our
choice of mical was driven by the fact that it was the only GI toolkit that supported
multi-letter alphabets. Additionally, mical was the only toolkit with an integrated
automata toolkit. The program processes the output flat text files from flowinfer using
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Figure B.2: Flowtool call graph (elided) - libnids creates a
packet processing event loop that dispatches events to registered
callback functions. The callback function named detect edge is
registered for TCP connection events. The detect edge callback
determines if the connection is on a port of interest and calls
the appropriate protocol data format parser in either do smtp
or do pop3.
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micals k-RI and k-TSSI algorithm implementations to generate Vaucanson automata.
The automata are output as GraphViz13 dot files and post-processed to graphics
by a driver script called flowtool data. The driver script builds the command line
parameters and invokes flowinfer for the selected algorithms for k values 1 to 5. A
summary of the automata states, edges, initial states, and terminal/final states is
generated from the output of flowinfer for analysis purposes. Low-level data structures
in mical and the integrated version of Vaucanson are implemented using the C++
standard template library.
Flowinfer was developed using the KDevelop IDE and autoconf build system.
The C++ source code supports the Doxygen documentation system.
13GraphViz - http://www.graphviz.org
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Appendix C. Inferred Automaton
This appendix presents the automaton inferred by the k-RI and k-TSSI algorithms
for the subset of the POP3 protocols exercised by the IDEVAL data set. Inferred
SMTP automaton are not presented here because the graphs were not legible if we
scaled the figures to fit on a single page.
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Figure C.1: k-TSSI POP3 Composite Final Automaton k = 1.
k-TSSI with k = 1 over-restricts the target automaton. Session
initiation and session termination are not inferred as separate
states.
122
Figure C.2: k-RI POP3 Composite Final Automaton k = 1.
k-RI inference exactly matches the target automaton for the
subset of POP3 specification exercised by the IDEVAL data set.
123
Figure C.3: k-RI POP3 Composite Final Automaton k = 2.
k-RI inference over-generalizes the target automaton.
124
Figure C.4: k-TSSI POP3 Composite Final Automaton k = 2.
k-TSSI with k = 2 exactly matches the k-RI inference with
k = 2. The hypothesis automaton over-generalizes the target
automaton.
125
Figure C.5: k-RI POP3 Composite Final Automaton k = 3.
k-RI inference continues to over-generalizes the target automa-
ton.
126
Figure C.6: k-TSSI POP3 Composite Final Automaton k = 3.
k-TSSI with k = 3 exactly matches the k-RI inference with
k = 3. It also over-generalizes the target automaton.
127
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